Flashpoints | Security | Southeast Asia

The Quad and ASEAN’s First Step Off The Fence

For the first time, the Quad issued a dedicated joint statement on cooperation with ASEAN.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio meets with Indo-Pacific Quad Foreign Ministers in Manila, Philippines, July 22, 2026.

The East Asia Summit, a forum for strategic, political, and economic dialogue comprising 19 countries, convened its 16th Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Manila on July 23. The summit, however, assumed significance because of events that occurred on its sidelines.

To begin with, the Quad Foreign Ministers met again and reiterated their commitments unveiled at the 11th Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Delhi two months ago. But it wasn’t their mere gathering that caught attention.

For the first time, the Quad issued a dedicated joint statement on cooperation with ASEAN, rather than just meeting alongside the regional grouping. The ministers framed themselves as “ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partners” and tied their agenda to “the practical implementation of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.” The statement identified four broad areas of cooperation: “maritime and transnational security, economic prosperity and security, critical and emerging technologies, and humanitarian assistance and emergency response.”

Reconvening in the same city where the Quad was revived in 2017, this time to issue a joint statement directly highlighting cooperation with ASEAN, is a response to critics who question the Quad’s lack of engagement with regional countries.

The fact that this joint statement, even though quite vague, came at ASEAN’s premier politico-security forum, of which China is also a founding member, is suggestive of two things.

On the one hand, it reflected the Quad’s willingness to overcome its appeasement of China. So far, despite being inherently a counterweight to China, the Quad has often resisted steps that can be seen as enraging Beijing. The meeting in Manila amounts to the shedding of that longstanding hesitation. For the Quad to hold its huddle there, in what is often described as China’s own strategic neighborhood, is a pointed signal aimed at Beijing.

On the other hand, the fact that ASEAN accepted and enabled the Quad’s effort to insert itself as a stakeholder with a collective interest in the region is significant. Beijing has repeatedly described the Quad as an Asian NATO and has made its discomfort with the grouping known. Further, ASEAN has always sought to avoid becoming an arena for great power rivalry. Beijing is a full participant in the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional........

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