The Pulse | Diplomacy | South Asia

How Pakistan is Redefining Middle Power Agency in the US-Israel War on Iran

Islamabad’s emergence as a channel illustrates how middle powers can punch above their weight when larger actors are hemmed in by their own alignments.

President Donald Trump with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshal Asim Munir in the Oval Office at the White House, Washington D.C., Sept. 13, 2025.

As the U.S.-Israel war on Iran enters its fourth week, Pakistan’s name has emerged as a mediator that is reportedly leading efforts to bring Tehran and Washington to the negotiating table. This development appears surprising for several reasons. It is hard to imagine that a conflict with such sweeping implications for global energy markets, supply chains and strategic stability would find Islamabad as a potential venue for de-escalation efforts.

Pakistan has long been associated in international commentary with domestic political turbulence and security concerns. Until a few days ago, observers would not have anticipated that the Pakistani leadership could suddenly occupy a central place in efforts to bridge two fierce adversaries which are actively trying to devastate each other. That said, the trajectory of recent back-channel activity involving Islamabad suggests that circumstances have aligned in ways that have placed Pakistan in an unexpected but highly important position where it is poised to play a role in ending the war with Iran.

Pakistan appears to have already helped exchange proposals between the two sides. According to security sources, Islamabad has relayed a set of American conditions for a ceasefire to Tehran and also conveyed Iranian responses back to Washington. While these exchanges seemingly remain limited and preliminary, they have helped in keeping a narrow channel of communication alive at a time when public statements from both capitals continue to signal confrontation.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif on Wednesday posted on X that Pakistan “welcomes and fully supports ongoing efforts to pursue dialogue to end the WAR in Middle East,” and indicated that Islamabad could host “meaningful and conclusive talks” if both parties wished.

The post gained added visibility when U.S. President Donald Trump shared it on his Truth Social account. The timing of the repost appeared to signal that Washington was using Pakistani channels to reach Iran. This offered the initiative a degree of credibility that might otherwise have been absent.

There appear to be four key reasons why Pakistan’s role has gained unexpected prominence amid efforts to create space for negotiations. While any eventual talks between the U.S. and Iran are going to be complex and fraught with complexity, even preliminary openings, as being pushed by Pakistan, could function as confidence-building steps.

First, Pakistan seems to have preserved a reputation as a relatively neutral actor with longstanding connections to both sides. The country maintains established ties with Iran’s Islamic Republic while sustaining a working relationship with the Trump administration. Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir spoke with Trump on Sunday to discuss the situation and perhaps assess Washington’s openness to dialogue. Similar exchanges have continued with Iranian counterparts. Last week, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi publicly thanked Pakistan for its stance during the conflict, and the new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, issued a statement, recalling his father’s regard for Pakistan.

A recent report also suggested that Munir also maintains contacts within Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) leadership. These links appear significant because Iran finds itself in open tension with much of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), including Saudi Arabia, which it has directly targeted. In an environment where trust is seemingly scarce, Pakistan’s position seems to have allowed it to function as a credible go-between between the two main warring parties.

Moreover, Pakistan’s neutrality is likely further reinforced by its ability to ensure its Strategic Defense Agreement with Saudi Arabia is not perceived as an anti-Iran alliance. Islamabad has long maintained that its security cooperation with Riyadh focuses on training, internal stability, and territorial defense, rather than projecting offensive power into the Persian Gulf’s sectarian or geopolitical fault lines. Consequently, the pact is not directed against any third party from the Muslim World, least of all Tehran.

Arguably, Tehran appears to share this understanding, which explains why Pakistan continues to work closely with Iran despite its defense pact with Riyadh. In fact, the Iranian leadership was among the first to welcome the agreement between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia as the beginning of a “comprehensive regional security system.” Tehran essentially recognizes the agreement as a stabilizing force rather than an instrument of containment. Despite changing realities in West Asia due to the U.S.-Israel-Iran war, the agreement isn’t seen in Iran as a threat to its interests.

It is fair to argue that Islamabad will not accept any role that would compromise its neighbor’s security or internal sectarian fault lines. This is a reality which Saudi Arabia also remains well aware off. Ultimately, framing the agreement as a threat to Tehran reflects a poor understanding and a miscalculation of regional strategic realities.

Second, Pakistan appears uniquely placed in a regional landscape where most other actors are viewed as aligned with one side or the other. For instance, Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt are perceived as parties to the conflict, whether through hosting American military facilities or through perceived closeness or ties to Israeli interests.

Pakistan, by contrast, hosts no U.S. bases and has avoided formal entanglement in the conflict. For more than a year, Munir seems to have quietly positioned himself as a conduit between Tehran and Washington. At the same time, Islamabad has been able to retain Saudi Arabia’s confidence, without which the country’s aggressive mediation efforts or proposals to host talks would be difficult to imagine. Moreover, other Gulf states, particularly Qatar, have also extended measured support to Pakistan’s initiative. The combination and situation have enabled a middle power like Pakistan to step into a vacuum that more powerful but more constrained players have not been able to fill.

Third, the episode seemingly highlights a broader trust deficit in Iran’s relations with the West, the Gulf, and established international institutions. Tehran has long regarded the European Union, the U.S., GCC countries and global bodies such as the United Nations and the U.N. Security Council as either biased or ineffective in protecting sovereign interests. In recent weeks, Russia and China have provided diplomatic cover but have stopped short of pressing either Washington or Tehran toward a concrete resolution of the crisis.

One can argue that this vacuum might have opened space for India to play a bigger role. However, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Israel shortly before the U.S. and Israeli strikes began on Iran. This seems to have tainted India’s image of neutrality and sidelined the country in the crisis, as per a New York Times report. At the same time, the Indian government has shown little inclination to mediate in the crisis effectively.

On the other hand, Pakistan moved in to fill the gap. Whether this positioning stems from deliberate strategy or fortunate circumstance remains open to debate, but it has certainly allowed Islamabad to present itself as a facilitator where others could not.

Fourth, Pakistan’s involvement seems to have extended beyond simple message-carrying into attempts to influence specific battlefield decisions. According to a Reuters report, Israel removed Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf from its list of assassination targets after Pakistan urged the United States to intervene as this would make negotiations difficult.

A Pakistani security source quoted in the report stated that “the Israelis have their coordinates and they wanted to eliminate them.”

“We told the U.S. that if they were eliminated, there would be no one to talk to. Therefore, the U.S. asked the Israelis to withdraw from it.”

No other country appears to have succeeded in altering U.S.-Israeli targeting priorities in real time, as most countries have limited themselves to general appeals for restraint. This suggests that Pakistan is not only relaying proposals but also attempting to shape conditions on the ground to preserve the possibility of dialogue.

These efforts from Pakistan are at a very early stage. Pakistan’s Foreign Office has asked the media to avoid excessive speculation over these developments. This is an indication that Islamabad is keen to manage expectations while it works to arrange a meeting between Iranian and American officials.

In a war that has seemingly already altered regional equations, Pakistan’s emergence as a channel illustrates how middle powers can punch above their weight when larger actors are hemmed in by their own alignments.

Whether Pakistan’s role broadens into substantive negotiations will depend ultimately on decisions taken in Tehran and Washington as much as on Islamabad’s continued navigation of a delicate path.

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As the U.S.-Israel war on Iran enters its fourth week, Pakistan’s name has emerged as a mediator that is reportedly leading efforts to bring Tehran and Washington to the negotiating table. This development appears surprising for several reasons. It is hard to imagine that a conflict with such sweeping implications for global energy markets, supply chains and strategic stability would find Islamabad as a potential venue for de-escalation efforts.

Pakistan has long been associated in international commentary with domestic political turbulence and security concerns. Until a few days ago, observers would not have anticipated that the Pakistani leadership could suddenly occupy a central place in efforts to bridge two fierce adversaries which are actively trying to devastate each other. That said, the trajectory of recent back-channel activity involving Islamabad suggests that circumstances have aligned in ways that have placed Pakistan in an unexpected but highly important position where it is poised to play a role in ending the war with Iran.

Pakistan appears to have already helped exchange proposals between the two sides. According to security sources, Islamabad has relayed a set of American conditions for a ceasefire to Tehran and also conveyed Iranian responses back to Washington. While these exchanges seemingly remain limited and preliminary, they have helped in keeping a narrow channel of communication alive at a time when public statements from both capitals continue to signal confrontation.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif on Wednesday posted on X that Pakistan “welcomes and fully supports ongoing efforts to pursue dialogue to end the WAR in Middle East,” and indicated that Islamabad could host “meaningful and conclusive talks” if both parties wished.

The post gained added visibility when U.S. President Donald Trump shared it on his Truth Social account. The timing of the repost appeared to signal that Washington was using Pakistani channels to reach Iran. This offered the initiative a degree of credibility that might otherwise have been absent.

There appear to be four key reasons why Pakistan’s role has gained unexpected prominence amid efforts to create space for negotiations. While any eventual talks between the U.S. and Iran are going to be complex and fraught with complexity, even preliminary openings, as being pushed by Pakistan, could function as confidence-building steps.

First, Pakistan seems to have preserved a reputation as a relatively neutral actor with longstanding connections to both sides. The country maintains established ties with Iran’s Islamic Republic while sustaining a working relationship with the Trump administration. Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir spoke with Trump on Sunday to discuss the situation and perhaps assess Washington’s openness to dialogue. Similar exchanges have continued with Iranian counterparts. Last week, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi publicly thanked Pakistan for its stance during the conflict, and the new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, issued a statement, recalling his father’s regard for Pakistan.

A recent report also suggested that Munir also maintains contacts within Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) leadership. These links appear significant because Iran finds itself in open tension with much of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), including Saudi Arabia, which it has directly targeted. In an environment where trust is seemingly scarce, Pakistan’s position seems to have allowed it to function as a credible go-between between the two main warring parties.

Moreover, Pakistan’s neutrality is likely further reinforced by its ability to ensure its Strategic Defense Agreement with Saudi Arabia is not perceived as an anti-Iran alliance. Islamabad has long maintained that its security cooperation with Riyadh focuses on training, internal stability, and territorial defense, rather than projecting offensive power into the Persian Gulf’s sectarian or geopolitical fault lines. Consequently, the pact is not directed against any third party from the Muslim World, least of all Tehran.

Arguably, Tehran appears to share this understanding, which explains why Pakistan continues to work closely with Iran despite its defense pact with Riyadh. In fact, the Iranian leadership was among the first to welcome the agreement between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia as the beginning of a “comprehensive regional security system.” Tehran essentially recognizes the agreement as a stabilizing force rather than an instrument of containment. Despite changing realities in West Asia due to the U.S.-Israel-Iran war, the agreement isn’t seen in Iran as a threat to its interests.

It is fair to argue that Islamabad will not accept any role that would compromise its neighbor’s security or internal sectarian fault lines. This is a reality which Saudi Arabia also remains well aware off. Ultimately, framing the agreement as a threat to Tehran reflects a poor understanding and a miscalculation of regional strategic realities.

Second, Pakistan appears uniquely placed in a regional landscape where most other actors are viewed as aligned with one side or the other. For instance, Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt are perceived as parties to the conflict, whether through hosting American military facilities or through perceived closeness or ties to Israeli interests.

Pakistan, by contrast, hosts no U.S. bases and has avoided formal entanglement in the conflict. For more than a year, Munir seems to have quietly positioned himself as a conduit between Tehran and Washington. At the same time, Islamabad has been able to retain Saudi Arabia’s confidence, without which the country’s aggressive mediation efforts or proposals to host talks would be difficult to imagine. Moreover, other Gulf states, particularly Qatar, have also extended measured support to Pakistan’s initiative. The combination and situation have enabled a middle power like Pakistan to step into a vacuum that more powerful but more constrained players have not been able to fill.

Third, the episode seemingly highlights a broader trust deficit in Iran’s relations with the West, the Gulf, and established international institutions. Tehran has long regarded the European Union, the U.S., GCC countries and global bodies such as the United Nations and the U.N. Security Council as either biased or ineffective in protecting sovereign interests. In recent weeks, Russia and China have provided diplomatic cover but have stopped short of pressing either Washington or Tehran toward a concrete resolution of the crisis.

One can argue that this vacuum might have opened space for India to play a bigger role. However, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Israel shortly before the U.S. and Israeli strikes began on Iran. This seems to have tainted India’s image of neutrality and sidelined the country in the crisis, as per a New York Times report. At the same time, the Indian government has shown little inclination to mediate in the crisis effectively.

On the other hand, Pakistan moved in to fill the gap. Whether this positioning stems from deliberate strategy or fortunate circumstance remains open to debate, but it has certainly allowed Islamabad to present itself as a facilitator where others could not.

Fourth, Pakistan’s involvement seems to have extended beyond simple message-carrying into attempts to influence specific battlefield decisions. According to a Reuters report, Israel removed Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf from its list of assassination targets after Pakistan urged the United States to intervene as this would make negotiations difficult.

A Pakistani security source quoted in the report stated that “the Israelis have their coordinates and they wanted to eliminate them.”

“We told the U.S. that if they were eliminated, there would be no one to talk to. Therefore, the U.S. asked the Israelis to withdraw from it.”

No other country appears to have succeeded in altering U.S.-Israeli targeting priorities in real time, as most countries have limited themselves to general appeals for restraint. This suggests that Pakistan is not only relaying proposals but also attempting to shape conditions on the ground to preserve the possibility of dialogue.

These efforts from Pakistan are at a very early stage. Pakistan’s Foreign Office has asked the media to avoid excessive speculation over these developments. This is an indication that Islamabad is keen to manage expectations while it works to arrange a meeting between Iranian and American officials.

In a war that has seemingly already altered regional equations, Pakistan’s emergence as a channel illustrates how middle powers can punch above their weight when larger actors are hemmed in by their own alignments.

Whether Pakistan’s role broadens into substantive negotiations will depend ultimately on decisions taken in Tehran and Washington as much as on Islamabad’s continued navigation of a delicate path.

Umair Jamal is a freelance journalist, independent researcher, and teaching fellow at Forman Christian College, analyzing South Asian security and politics.

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