Flashpoints | Security | East Asia | Oceania

China’s Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile Test Was a Message to the Pacific

The list of countries notified in advance, as well as the timing, suggests that China’s purpose was not merely a straightforward display of military power.

On July 6, China fired off a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) carrying a training warhead from a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy nuclear-powered submarine into the Pacific Ocean. This marked China’s second intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch into the Pacific region, following the PLA Rocket Force’s test of a land-based ICBM in 2024.

As in 2024, Beijing did not publicly disclose detailed information about the operation. The submarine’s location, the missile type, and the missile’s flight path all remain unknown. This lack of transparency makes it difficult for outside observers to assess the current development of the PLA’s nuclear strike capabilities.

Although the details of the PLA’s missile launch remain unclear, Beijing did notify selected countries in advance, thereby offering clues about the intent behind the launch. Before the SLBM was fired, China informed countries including Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea (PNG), and Japan through diplomatic channels – although several of the notified governments said they had been informed mere hours in advance.

On the same day as China’s SLBM launch, the leaders of Australia and Fiji signed a mutual defense treaty in Suva, Fiji. The fact that the countries notified in advance all maintain close ties with Australia, combined with Beijing’s decision to conduct the military operation during a major Australian diplomatic agenda, suggests that China’s purpose was not merely a straightforward display of military power.

Although bilateral tensions between Australia and China have gradually eased since 2022, and trade and economic relations have largely recovered, Australia has continued to build up its defense capabilities in response to potential threats. At the same time, Beijing has increasingly begun to use military actions as a way to signal its position to Australia. In early 2025, the PLAN sent ships to circumnavigate Australia. While in the Tasman Sea, the naval task group even conducted live-fire exercises, without any advance warning to Australia.

Therefore, when China chose to launch a missile on the same day Australia concluded a new alliance, the action carried political intent in addition to demonstrating military strength.

As one of the world’s top three nuclear powers, China possesses a large nuclear arsenal and a nuclear triad strike capability. Given the need to maintain open communication channels and avoid miscalculation, Beijing usually provides advance notification to countries located along or near the missile’s projected flight path when conducting intercontinental ballistic missile exercises.

For this reason, during its 2024 missile test, Beijing notified the United States, France, Australia, and New Zealand in advance. Ahead of this latest missile test, however, only Australia, New Zealand, PNG, and Japan publicly stated that they had received advance notification from Beijing.

Because China likewise did not release a complete list of countries it notified in advance, whether Beijing notified the United States remains open to speculation. A State Department statement declined to address the question. At the same time, this ambiguity also helps sharpen the political signal that China sought to convey.

The missile launch took place on the same day that Australia and Fiji signed the Ocean of Peace Alliance, also known as the Veitacini Treaty. The treaty’s legal status is like that of the Pukpuk Treaty signed by Australia and PNG in October 2025. It emphasizes that, in the event of an armed attack, both sides will act in accordance with their domestic procedures to address common threats. This makes Fiji Australia’s fourth ally and expands Canberra’s influence in the South Pacific.

At the level of the individual event, Australia’s establishment of an alliance relationship with a single Pacific Island country would hardly be sufficient reason for China to respond with military action. However, Beijing would like to prevent Australia from continuing to build security relationships through formal treaties. This........

© The Diplomat