The last month has seen a quickfire series of developments that outline the Trump administration’s plans for the handling of the security of Taiwan. While the 2025 National Security Strategy soft-pedals the overall U.S. defense posture toward China compared to the previous two editions, reinforcing the ability to “deny any attempt to seize Taiwan or achieve a balance of forces so unfavorable to us as to make defending that island impossible” is the most notable military commitment put forward in the document.

Additionally, the recently passed 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) contains initiatives to support Taiwan, including $1 billion in military aid and a requirement for Washington and Taipei to collaborate on drone and counter-drone development.

Most recently, the decision by the Trump administration to notify Congress of its greenlighting of a series of arms sales worth up to $11.1 billion also points to the island’s central position in U.S. strategy – despite perceived moves to placate Beijing (reportedly including a pause on military aid to Taiwan earlier this year) as part of trade negotiations.

While fears exist of a U.S. deal with Beijing that sells out Taiwan in exchange for a more favorable relationship with China, this was always unlikely. As my book “War Plan Taiwan: OPLAN 5077 and the U.S. Struggle for the Pacific” outlines, Taiwan has long been recognized as a key strategic territory in the region, and its fate – real and imagined – has informed a century of U.S. defense policy and planning. The 2025 NSS’ assertion that “there is, rightly, much focus on Taiwan… mostly because Taiwan provides direct access to the Second Island Chain and splits Northeast and Southeast Asia into two distinct theaters” is only the latest manifestation of this.

There was, of course, a dramatic rupture in relations between Washington and Taipei in 1979 when the U.S. switched official recognition of what constituted China from the Republic of China (ROC) to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). But even following this, provisions under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and other initiatives sustained links, and Department of Defense contingency plans were maintained to defend Taiwan. Importantly, the TRA obliges the U.S. to furnish Taipei with sufficient weapons for its defense. Today, geography and more contemporary issues – most notably, Taiwan remains the West’s leading supplier of the advanced semiconductors critical to the AI revolution – have once again positioned the country on the front line.

We are currently awaiting the publication of the updated U.S. National Defence Strategy (NDS) and, eventually, a public summary of a new National Military Strategy (NMS). However, the direction of travel is clear. While the security of the U.S. homeland and Western hemisphere lead, the 2025 NSS lists “deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch” and “denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain” as priorities. Although fears of a subtle alteration in language related to the U.S. position on the island – a shift from “we oppose” any unilateral change in the status of Taiwan in the 2022 NSS to the less........

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