China Power | Diplomacy | East Asia

Bolivia’s Troubled Path With China

Chinese activities in Bolivia have deteriorated remarkably from their heyday under the populist leftist governments of Evo Morales and Luis Arce.

In May 2026, as Bolivia was paralyzed by protests seeking to topple the government of Rodrigo Paz, China’s ambassador to Bolivia, Wang Liang, was conspicuously silent about the crisis. While anti-government elements threw dynamite at police and maintained roadblocks that denied the entry of food, gasoline and even medical supplies into the capital, La Paz, Wang held an economic forum in the southern department of Tarija, ironically titled “Bolivia, into the world with China.”

From May 20-30, 2026, the author traveled to Bolivia, engaging with business, academic and government personnel on the evolution of the country’s relationship with China, among other topics. This work reflects insights from those engagements and supporting research.

Chinese activities in Bolivia have deteriorated remarkably from their heyday under the populist leftist governments of Evo Morales and Luis Arce, reflecting a myriad of projects tainted with corruption, poor performance and resistance by affected communities. Bolivia’s deepening economic, fiscal, and political crisis, and efforts by the Paz government to rebuild positive relations with the United States and other Western countries, have also limited China’s advance.

From 2006-2019, the Morales government threw Bolivia’s doors wide open for economic, military, technical and other cooperation from China. During that period, China sold Bolivia six K-8 fighter aircraft, six Z-9 military helicopters, 31 armored vehicles, and an unspecified number of trucks and patrol boats. Bolivia also purchased from China the BOL-110 national surveillance system, customs scanners, and the Tupac Katari satellite, with China providing the construction and instrumentation of space ground facilities at Amachuma (La Paz) and the La Guardia district of Santa Cruz, as well as sending Chinese technicians to support the facilities. 

According to Bolivian businesspeople interviewed for this article, more than 60 Chinese companies were active in the country during that period. Their activities included selling phone equipment and building digital infrastructure for the national telecommunications company ENTEL; supplying equipment for and doing work for the mining and petroleum sectors; and engaging in an estimated $6 billion in infrastructure projects, from asphalt and zinc processing plants, to hydroelectric facilities such as Rositas, San Jose and Ivirzu, to major road and railway projects. 

Yet virtually all of these involved contracts with the Bolivian state for Chinese goods and services, rather than actual investment in Bolivian industry. Today, less than 20 China-based companies still operate in the country. China’s own ambassador Wang Liang has blamed the uncertain nature of Bolivia’s political and economic environment for the lack of Chinese investment.

In the domain of infrastructure, virtually all of China’s projects are at a standstill. Its major construction companies active in Bolivia – Sinohydro, Vicstar, and CAMCE – have closed or significantly reduced their offices. 

Those Chinese projects that were undertaken have been plagued by controversy. The Paz government has refused to accept delivery of a major highway from Santa Cruz to Cochabamba built by Sinohydro, due to numerous identified structural defects. The $460 million steel processing facility built by Sinosteel at El Mutún is far past its promised initial delivery date, has hundreds of identified defects, and has yet to produce an ounce of steel. Mega-projects that were once under discussion – such as the IIRSA Central rail line connecting the Atlantic and Pacific through Bolivia – are no longer even seriously discussed.

At the local level, Chinese companies are impeded by problems largely of their own making. Bolivian construction-sector executives interviewed for this work noted that few local firms want to provide services to Chinese firms due in part to predatory practices of paying very poorly, and often late, as well as issues with their compliance with local labor, environmental, and other laws.

In Bolivia’s petroleum sector, there were reportedly quality issues with drilling equipment and services sold by China-based companies to the prior Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) government. There has been little recent work by China-based companies in the industry.

In mining, a number of smaller Chinese companies reportedly sell equipment and purchase gold and other metals, principally in the informal mining sector, but there have been almost no formal investments by major Chinese mining companies.

Chinese companies CATL and........

© The Diplomat