For the Arakan Army, Recognition Must Be Earned
The Debate | Opinion | Southeast Asia
For the Arakan Army, Recognition Must Be Earned
The Arakan Army’s quest for international recognition should be tied to Rohingya rights and accountability.
Recently, Human Rights Watch published a distressing investigative report, tellingly titled “Skeletons and Skulls Scattered Everywhere.” The report confirmed that the Arakan Army had massacred at least 170 Rohingya civilians, including 90 children, and likely killed or wounded hundreds more in the village of Hoyyar Siri (Htan Shauk Khan in Burmese) in the Buthidaung Township of Myanmar’s Rakhine State on May 2, 2024.
This constitutes only a small fraction of the Arakan Army’s record of human rights violations against the Rohingyas. Since the ethnic armed organization (EAO) has wrested control of much of the Rakhine State in 2023-2024, it has expelled more than 150,000 Rohingyas into Bangladesh, committed war crimes — massacres, rape, and arson — against Rohingya civilians; subjected them to severe restrictions, extortion, and forced conscription; and even banned the use of the word “Rohingya” upon the threat of harsh penalty. In fact, Major General Twan Mrat Naing, the commander-in-chief of the Arakan Army and the Chairman of the United League of Arakan (ULA), had publicly denied the distinct identity of the Rohingyas, terming them as “Bengalis.”
Thus, while the Arakan Army is deliberately refusing to recognize the distinct identity of the Rohingyas, who constituted between 25 and 30 percent of the population of Rakhine State before the 2017 “cleansing operations,” it is seeking international recognition for its de facto control over Rakhine State.
Using the geostrategic importance of Rakhine State as a leverage, the Arakan Army is trying to legitimize its territorial and administrative control over state by seeking recognition from external actors with political, economic, security, and strategic interests in the region, particularly China, India, Bangladesh, and the United States. Rakhine State holds substantial reserves of oil and natural gas, has strategic access to the Indian Ocean, hosts important Chinese and Indian geo-strategic projects, and often serves as a conduit or transit route for regional non-state armed actors. Using these factors as bargaining chips, the Arakan Army is trying to attain international recognition.
In international law, the issue of the recognition of a new state or a new government is highly complex. Since the Arakan Army has not yet made a formal declaration of independence, the question of the recognition of an independent Rakhine State is moot from the viewpoint of international law. Hence, the question is about the recognition of its government. So far, while the Arakan Army has not yet declared independence, it has formed its own government for Rakhine State, termed the Arakan People’s Revolutionary Government (APRG), which is essentially controlled by the ULA. Meanwhile, the Rakhine State Government, located in the capital Sittwe, is formally under the Tatmadaw-backed Myanmar Union Government. Thus, Rakhine State currently has two rival governments.
The situation on the ground is as follows: the Arakan Army controls approximately 90 percent of the territory of Rakhine State, along with the Paletwa Township of Chin State. In these territories, the APRG acts as the de facto government. The military-backed Rakhine State Government remains the de jure government of the state, but its de facto authority is currently restricted to the state capital Sittwe, the strategic port of Kyaukphyu, and parts of the Ann Township which the military controls.
As long as the Rakhine State Government retains control of Sittwe, it is unlikely that any........
