Why Are Educated Baloch Women Turning to Militancy? 

The Corps Commander of Balochistan asked the question. He may not like the answer.

Thousands of protesters participate in a rally organized by the Baloch Yakjehti Committee commemorating those killed in the crackdown on the “Baloch Raji Muchi,” Aug. 13, 2024.

During a recent conversation with a group of newly recruited civil servants in Pakistan’s emerging port city of Gwadar, the Corps Commander of Balochistan, Lt. General Rahat Nadeem Ahmed Khan, the province’s highest-ranking military official, asked about the factors driving young, educated women toward militancy. 

In the same discussion, he briefly mentioned prominent Baloch rights activists, including Dr. Mahrang Baloch and Sammi Deen Baloch, both of whom are women. According to those familiar with the exchange, Khan said Sammi Deen’s activism is relatively moderate, acknowledging her stated commitment to addressing the issue of Baloch missing persons within the framework of Pakistan’s Constitution. Despite this admission by a top military official, her name remains on the country’s domestic anti-terrorism watch list, locally known as the Fourth Schedule, for over six months. 

Khan was more critical of Dr. Mahrang Baloch. He called her more radical, while in the same breath, he expressed some hope that she may have changed in prison, where she has been since March 2025. He referenced her recent op-ed in The Guardian, in which Dr. Baloch wrote that the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC), the civil rights movement she leads, has remained firmly within Pakistan’s constitutional framework and is committed to resisting human rights violations through peaceful political means. In the same op-ed, Dr. Baloch reiterated that she has consistently condemned all violence in Balochistan and any group that harms innocent people. 

The corps commander later gave a presentation in which he mentioned my name and framed me as a national security threat.

Later, I was asked the same question that Khan had raised by some who were part of that conversation: what is driving young, educated Baloch women toward militancy? 

My short answer is this: the primary driver behind this trend is oppressive state policy, implemented by the military in Balochistan through its proxies. A more detailed explanation points to the disconnect between ordinary Baloch people and policymakers, especially those in Punjab and Islamabad, which has created a dangerous communication gap. The treatment of critical voices – political dissidents such as Mahrang Baloch and Sammi Deen, as well as rights activists and journalists – as national security threats has further intensified the problem.

For years, the military has tried to control Balochistan through handpicked politicians, often described locally as “artificial leaders,” “war beneficiaries,” or “proxies of the military.” They have always misled power brokers in Punjab and senior military officials about the province’s ground realities. 

It is important to note that the majority of military officers come from Punjab, meaning they have limited understanding of Balochistan’s long-standing grievances and its contentious relationship with the state of Pakistan since 1948. Balochistan has seen four insurgencies in the past; the current one is the fifth and longest, and it represents a continuation of previous cycles of unrest. The province’s artificial leadership, however, has consistently framed the insurgency as purely foreign-driven.

In recent years, this leadership has routinely labeled critical Baloch voices as sympathizers of armed groups, anti-Pakistan elements, or proxies of hostile agencies, and often silenced them through bans, crackdowns, or imprisonment. For example, since March 2025, Dr. Mahrang Baloch has remained behind bars on what many consider weak terrorism-related charges. 

The communication gap between Balochistan and Punjab widened after the controversial 2018 general elections, when the military establishment created the Balochistan Awami Party (BAP) overnight and brought it to power.

These politicians lacked public legitimacy and remained disconnected from the real issues facing the people. Instead, they focused on accumulating wealth through corruption and misuse of power, often in the name of patriotism. It was during this period that the insurgency took a more violent turn, and the possibility of meaningful negotiations with disgruntled Baloch youth began to shrink, pushing more young people toward militancy.

A similar, even more troubling, pattern emerged during the 2024 general elections. The elections were widely rigged. The current chief minister of Balochistan, Sarfaraz Ahmed Bugti, was then part of the caretaker government responsible for ensuring free and fair elections, but resigned just weeks before the vote, apparently violating Article 224(1B) of Pakistan’s Constitution, which bars caretaker officials from contesting elections. Despite this, he ran and won the election to become chief minister. 

Once in office, he has used significant state resources to target Baloch rights activists, the BYC, Baloch nationalist parties, and journalists, branding them as anti-state, militant sympathizers, or agents of hostile agencies. Thousands of critics have been arrested, disappeared, or added to the Fourth Schedule. He has also invested in shaping narratives by inviting journalists and influencers from Punjab and Islamabad to depict Baloch activists as anti-state. Although the chief minister of Balochistan, his messaging seems aimed primarily at audiences in Punjab.

Since 2018, and especially after the disputed 2024 elections, political representation in Balochistan has completely lost credibility among the Baloch population. Those in power are widely seen as disconnected from the local population and dependent on Punjab for political survival. As a result, they often resort to provocative rhetoric against local activists and human rights defenders, sometimes deliberately fueling tensions to maintain relevance in the eyes of power brokers in Punjab and Islamabad. This pattern is evident in the conduct of the current ruling elite. 

In response, more conscious youth, particularly young women, are being drawn toward armed groups. This trend has intensified after the arrest of Dr. Baloch, a leader of a large peaceful movement, who faces multiple charges despite advocating nonviolent resistance.

The linguistic, cultural, political, and psychological gap between ordinary Baloch people and power centers in Islamabad and Punjab has further allowed provincial elites to mislead decision-makers, many of whom have limited engagement with Balochistan’s social fabric. While such divisions exist across Pakistan, in Balochistan, they are complicated by limited representation in the National Assembly. The province has fewer seats than major cities like Karachi or Lahore, making it less influential and less attractive to mainstream political parties such as Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and the ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N).

Balochistan’s structural isolation further deepens the problem. The province lacks large-scale industry, well-established universities that attract students from other provinces, and a functioning tourism sector. As a result, policymakers and the urban middle class in Pakistan have a limited understanding of Baloch grievances, social realities, and historical tensions with the state. 

This information vacuum has enabled the spread of simplified narratives that attribute unrest primarily to foreign interference, an explanation readily accepted by those with little direct engagement with Baloch society. Few acknowledge that Baloch grievances date back to 1948 and that the current insurgency is a continuation of earlier insurgencies.

Furthermore, inflammatory and derogatory rhetoric against Baloch rights activists by political figures such as Sarfaraz Bugti and former caretaker Prime Minister Anwar-ul-Haq Kakar has contributed to the problem. By using state-backed platforms to portray activists as hostile or anti-Pakistan, they have alienated Baloch youth and inadvertently pushed more youth toward militancy.

Balochistan’s current volatile security situation is not only the result of neglect, deprivation, and repression, but also of the persistent targeting and delegitimization of Baloch voices. In 2025, Pakistan ranked first on the Global Terrorism Index, with a 6 percent increase in terrorism-related deaths (1,139), and Balochistan was among the most affected provinces. In 2024, attacks by Baloch insurgents rose by 119 percent, with the Baloch Liberation Army emerging as a major perpetrator. This escalation has coincided with the rise of the current political leadership in Balochistan.

Tensions between the Baloch and the state intensified when the families of missing persons held a sit-in protest in Islamabad between December 2023 and January 2024. At the time, Kakar was serving as caretaker prime minister. The government responded with a vile media campaign and ordered police to use force against protesters. Subsequent developments, including the mistreatment of protesters in Gwadar in July 2024, the arrest of Dr. Baloch in March 2025, and continued inciting language by top government officials, have deepened resentment among Baloch youth. This growing frustration is a key factor driving younger, educated women toward militancy.

If Lt. General Khan truly seeks answers and solutions, he must move beyond questioning people’s patriotism and seeing critical voices as a national security threat. The real starting point for improving the security situation in the province is a fundamental, long-term reassessment of state policy in Balochistan.

At the heart of the crisis lies a collapse of political legitimacy and trust. Rebuilding this requires ending enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings, releasing prominent jailed Baloch rights activists instead of viewing them as national security threats, and replacing the current provincial setup with genuinely representative leadership. 

Without credible political representation, no security-driven approach can bring peace or stop women (and men) from joining armed groups.

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During a recent conversation with a group of newly recruited civil servants in Pakistan’s emerging port city of Gwadar, the Corps Commander of Balochistan, Lt. General Rahat Nadeem Ahmed Khan, the province’s highest-ranking military official, asked about the factors driving young, educated women toward militancy. 

In the same discussion, he briefly mentioned prominent Baloch rights activists, including Dr. Mahrang Baloch and Sammi Deen Baloch, both of whom are women. According to those familiar with the exchange, Khan said Sammi Deen’s activism is relatively moderate, acknowledging her stated commitment to addressing the issue of Baloch missing persons within the framework of Pakistan’s Constitution. Despite this admission by a top military official, her name remains on the country’s domestic anti-terrorism watch list, locally known as the Fourth Schedule, for over six months. 

Khan was more critical of Dr. Mahrang Baloch. He called her more radical, while in the same breath, he expressed some hope that she may have changed in prison, where she has been since March 2025. He referenced her recent op-ed in The Guardian, in which Dr. Baloch wrote that the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC), the civil rights movement she leads, has remained firmly within Pakistan’s constitutional framework and is committed to resisting human rights violations through peaceful political means. In the same op-ed, Dr. Baloch reiterated that she has consistently condemned all violence in Balochistan and any group that harms innocent people. 

The corps commander later gave a presentation in which he mentioned my name and framed me as a national security threat.

Later, I was asked the same question that Khan had raised by some who were part of that conversation: what is driving young, educated Baloch women toward militancy? 

My short answer is this: the primary driver behind this trend is oppressive state policy, implemented by the military in Balochistan through its proxies. A more detailed explanation points to the disconnect between ordinary Baloch people and policymakers, especially those in Punjab and Islamabad, which has created a dangerous communication gap. The treatment of critical voices – political dissidents such as Mahrang Baloch and Sammi Deen, as well as rights activists and journalists – as national security threats has further intensified the problem.

For years, the military has tried to control Balochistan through handpicked politicians, often described locally as “artificial leaders,” “war beneficiaries,” or “proxies of the military.” They have always misled power brokers in Punjab and senior military officials about the province’s ground realities. 

It is important to note that the majority of military officers come from Punjab, meaning they have limited understanding of Balochistan’s long-standing grievances and its contentious relationship with the state of Pakistan since 1948. Balochistan has seen four insurgencies in the past; the current one is the fifth and longest, and it represents a continuation of previous cycles of unrest. The province’s artificial leadership, however, has consistently framed the insurgency as purely foreign-driven.

In recent years, this leadership has routinely labeled critical Baloch voices as sympathizers of armed groups, anti-Pakistan elements, or proxies of hostile agencies, and often silenced them through bans, crackdowns, or imprisonment. For example, since March 2025, Dr. Mahrang Baloch has remained behind bars on what many consider weak terrorism-related charges. 

The communication gap between Balochistan and Punjab widened after the controversial 2018 general elections, when the military establishment created the Balochistan Awami Party (BAP) overnight and brought it to power.

These politicians lacked public legitimacy and remained disconnected from the real issues facing the people. Instead, they focused on accumulating wealth through corruption and misuse of power, often in the name of patriotism. It was during this period that the insurgency took a more violent turn, and the possibility of meaningful negotiations with disgruntled Baloch youth began to shrink, pushing more young people toward militancy.

A similar, even more troubling, pattern emerged during the 2024 general elections. The elections were widely rigged. The current chief minister of Balochistan, Sarfaraz Ahmed Bugti, was then part of the caretaker government responsible for ensuring free and fair elections, but resigned just weeks before the vote, apparently violating Article 224(1B) of Pakistan’s Constitution, which bars caretaker officials from contesting elections. Despite this, he ran and won the election to become chief minister. 

Once in office, he has used significant state resources to target Baloch rights activists, the BYC, Baloch nationalist parties, and journalists, branding them as anti-state, militant sympathizers, or agents of hostile agencies. Thousands of critics have been arrested, disappeared, or added to the Fourth Schedule. He has also invested in shaping narratives by inviting journalists and influencers from Punjab and Islamabad to depict Baloch activists as anti-state. Although the chief minister of Balochistan, his messaging seems aimed primarily at audiences in Punjab.

Since 2018, and especially after the disputed 2024 elections, political representation in Balochistan has completely lost credibility among the Baloch population. Those in power are widely seen as disconnected from the local population and dependent on Punjab for political survival. As a result, they often resort to provocative rhetoric against local activists and human rights defenders, sometimes deliberately fueling tensions to maintain relevance in the eyes of power brokers in Punjab and Islamabad. This pattern is evident in the conduct of the current ruling elite. 

In response, more conscious youth, particularly young women, are being drawn toward armed groups. This trend has intensified after the arrest of Dr. Baloch, a leader of a large peaceful movement, who faces multiple charges despite advocating nonviolent resistance.

The linguistic, cultural, political, and psychological gap between ordinary Baloch people and power centers in Islamabad and Punjab has further allowed provincial elites to mislead decision-makers, many of whom have limited engagement with Balochistan’s social fabric. While such divisions exist across Pakistan, in Balochistan, they are complicated by limited representation in the National Assembly. The province has fewer seats than major cities like Karachi or Lahore, making it less influential and less attractive to mainstream political parties such as Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and the ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N).

Balochistan’s structural isolation further deepens the problem. The province lacks large-scale industry, well-established universities that attract students from other provinces, and a functioning tourism sector. As a result, policymakers and the urban middle class in Pakistan have a limited understanding of Baloch grievances, social realities, and historical tensions with the state. 

This information vacuum has enabled the spread of simplified narratives that attribute unrest primarily to foreign interference, an explanation readily accepted by those with little direct engagement with Baloch society. Few acknowledge that Baloch grievances date back to 1948 and that the current insurgency is a continuation of earlier insurgencies.

Furthermore, inflammatory and derogatory rhetoric against Baloch rights activists by political figures such as Sarfaraz Bugti and former caretaker Prime Minister Anwar-ul-Haq Kakar has contributed to the problem. By using state-backed platforms to portray activists as hostile or anti-Pakistan, they have alienated Baloch youth and inadvertently pushed more youth toward militancy.

Balochistan’s current volatile security situation is not only the result of neglect, deprivation, and repression, but also of the persistent targeting and delegitimization of Baloch voices. In 2025, Pakistan ranked first on the Global Terrorism Index, with a 6 percent increase in terrorism-related deaths (1,139), and Balochistan was among the most affected provinces. In 2024, attacks by Baloch insurgents rose by 119 percent, with the Baloch Liberation Army emerging as a major perpetrator. This escalation has coincided with the rise of the current political leadership in Balochistan.

Tensions between the Baloch and the state intensified when the families of missing persons held a sit-in protest in Islamabad between December 2023 and January 2024. At the time, Kakar was serving as caretaker prime minister. The government responded with a vile media campaign and ordered police to use force against protesters. Subsequent developments, including the mistreatment of protesters in Gwadar in July 2024, the arrest of Dr. Baloch in March 2025, and continued inciting language by top government officials, have deepened resentment among Baloch youth. This growing frustration is a key factor driving younger, educated women toward militancy.

If Lt. General Khan truly seeks answers and solutions, he must move beyond questioning people’s patriotism and seeing critical voices as a national security threat. The real starting point for improving the security situation in the province is a fundamental, long-term reassessment of state policy in Balochistan.

At the heart of the crisis lies a collapse of political legitimacy and trust. Rebuilding this requires ending enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings, releasing prominent jailed Baloch rights activists instead of viewing them as national security threats, and replacing the current provincial setup with genuinely representative leadership. 

Without credible political representation, no security-driven approach can bring peace or stop women (and men) from joining armed groups.

Kiyya Baloch, a freelance journalist, reports on the Baloch separatist insurgency, politics, militancy, and violence in Balochistan. He tweets at @KiyyaBaloch.

Balochistan alienation

Balochistan enforced disappearances

Balochistan human rights

Balochistan militancy

Balochistan missing persons

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