Tokyo Report | Politics | East Asia

Takaichi Sanae and the Constitutional Revision Debate

It’s not as simple as China would have it.

In elections for Japan’s Lower House held in early February, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) led by President Takaichi Sanae scored an historic victory, with the government parties winning more than two-thirds of the seats. Holding a two-thirds majority has tremendous significance in Japan, because it gives the government the ability to move forward with revising Japan’s constitution.

Reacting to the election results, China has sounded the alarm, stepping up its propaganda efforts to warn that Takaichi may seek to do just that. In fact, the LDP has been calling for constitutional revisions ever since it was founded. Yet the issue hardly came up during the Lower House elections; Takaichi and her party instead argued for consumption tax cuts and a more proactive fiscal policy. Now that revising the constitution is at least feasible, it is worth taking a closer look at some of the surrounding issues.

First, this is an institutional issue. Eighty years after World War II, not a single word of Japan’s constitution has been revised. It is quite rare for a country to leave its constitution entirely untouched for eight decades. One reason why Japan hasn’t made any changes is institutional. Revising the constitution requires that an original bill be submitted with the approval of the members of the Diet (at least 100 members in the House of Representatives and 50 in the House of Councilors). For the bill to be adopted, it needs support from more than two-thirds of both houses as well as a majority in a national referendum. The LDP now holds two-thirds of the seats in the House of Representatives, but not in the House of Councilors. If the LDP does decide to revise the constitution, how will it secure that number?

Second, there is the question of what actually is to be revised. Takaichi’s long-standing argument is that the constitution should make clear that the Self-Defense Forces are constitutional. This aligns with former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s proposal in May 2017 that the “Self-Defense Forces” should be explicitly acknowledged while keeping Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 9, a position that differs from the LDP’s earlier proposal (deleting Paragraph 2 of Article 9). Rather than being a new argument, it has been prepared as a refutation of the view prevalent among some leftists in Japan that the existence of the Self-Defense Forces itself is unconstitutional. However, public opinion polls make clear that only a small number of Japanese agree with that take. That is, both Abe and Takaichi have proposed that something largely accepted in Japan today should be added to the constitution. Meanwhile, separate from the question of the Self-Defense Forces, there has in recent years been growing sentiment in favor of adding an emergency clause to the constitution that would extend the terms of office of members of the Diet in the event of an emergency.

Another proposal would add articles on environmental rights and education. If this is put forward, which voters will be vocal in opposing it? Of course, there are concerns that if even a slight amendment is made, it would eventually lead to a sweeping revision of Article 9. These concerns are, however, increasingly limited to a certain generation. Younger Japanese are more likely to decide based on the actually content of the proposal. Japanese opinion polls suggest that a majority of Japanese favor constitutional revision. If we are talking about a “constitutional revision” in general terms, then that already has majority support.

Third, there is the question of Article 9 itself. Public opinion is also evenly divided when it comes to Article 9, although again younger Japanese are more likely to favor a revision. Although younger Japanese look more favorably on China, they are also more likely to support an Article 9 revision.

In any case, the issue of constitutional revision and the issue of revising Article 9 are not the same in Japan. Is revising Article 9 tantamount to immediate “militarization”? Some in Japan worry about changes in how the constitution is interpreted, even without it actually being amended. They argue that the text of the constitution should be made clearer and policies more narrowly defined. As such, not all proponents of revising the constitution are conservatives; some are also liberals who want to see Article 9 revised. This complexity is little understood outside Japan. The simplistic nature of the propaganda from China tends to encourage the thinking that amending the Japanese constitution means an Article 9 revision, which in turn amounts to militarization. The reality is not that simple.

Fourth, there is the question of what incentive Japanese conservatives have to revise Article 9. If the government decides to move ahead, it will need to use considerable political capital, at a cost measured in declining approval ratings. It arguably does not need to accept that cost. The right to collective self-defense has already been recognized in the Legislation for Peace and Security of the 2010s, and future policy adjustments can be achieved simply by revising the legislation package or the “Three Security Documents” (the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program). For the near term at least, it is hard to pinpoint any policy changes that can only be made by revising the constitution.

When asked, successive Liberal Democratic Party administrations have consistently said that they seek to revise the constitution as a key plank of the party platform. The same is true for the Takaichi administration, which has apparently already issued instructions for specific revision procedures. However, the procedural hurdles are high, and the outcome of any discussion in Japan will be quite different depending on what is actually proposed. Whatever the outcome, though, the issue cannot be reduced to a simplistic understanding of an Article 9 revision and subsequent militarization.

Get to the bottom of the story

Subscribe today and join thousands of diplomats, analysts, policy professionals and business readers who rely on The Diplomat for expert Asia-Pacific coverage.

Get unlimited access to in-depth analysis you won't find anywhere else, from South China Sea tensions to ASEAN diplomacy to India-Pakistan relations. More than 5,000 articles a year.

Unlimited articles and expert analysis

Weekly newsletter with exclusive insights

16-year archive of diplomatic coverage

Ad-free reading on all devices

Support independent journalism

Already have an account? Log in.

In elections for Japan’s Lower House held in early February, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) led by President Takaichi Sanae scored an historic victory, with the government parties winning more than two-thirds of the seats. Holding a two-thirds majority has tremendous significance in Japan, because it gives the government the ability to move forward with revising Japan’s constitution.

Reacting to the election results, China has sounded the alarm, stepping up its propaganda efforts to warn that Takaichi may seek to do just that. In fact, the LDP has been calling for constitutional revisions ever since it was founded. Yet the issue hardly came up during the Lower House elections; Takaichi and her party instead argued for consumption tax cuts and a more proactive fiscal policy. Now that revising the constitution is at least feasible, it is worth taking a closer look at some of the surrounding issues.

First, this is an institutional issue. Eighty years after World War II, not a single word of Japan’s constitution has been revised. It is quite rare for a country to leave its constitution entirely untouched for eight decades. One reason why Japan hasn’t made any changes is institutional. Revising the constitution requires that an original bill be submitted with the approval of the members of the Diet (at least 100 members in the House of Representatives and 50 in the House of Councilors). For the bill to be adopted, it needs support from more than two-thirds of both houses as well as a majority in a national referendum. The LDP now holds two-thirds of the seats in the House of Representatives, but not in the House of Councilors. If the LDP does decide to revise the constitution, how will it secure that number?

Second, there is the question of what actually is to be revised. Takaichi’s long-standing argument is that the constitution should make clear that the Self-Defense Forces are constitutional. This aligns with former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s proposal in May 2017 that the “Self-Defense Forces” should be explicitly acknowledged while keeping Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 9, a position that differs from the LDP’s earlier proposal (deleting Paragraph 2 of Article 9). Rather than being a new argument, it has been prepared as a refutation of the view prevalent among some leftists in Japan that the existence of the Self-Defense Forces itself is unconstitutional. However, public opinion polls make clear that only a small number of Japanese agree with that take. That is, both Abe and Takaichi have proposed that something largely accepted in Japan today should be added to the constitution. Meanwhile, separate from the question of the Self-Defense Forces, there has in recent years been growing sentiment in favor of adding an emergency clause to the constitution that would extend the terms of office of members of the Diet in the event of an emergency.

Another proposal would add articles on environmental rights and education. If this is put forward, which voters will be vocal in opposing it? Of course, there are concerns that if even a slight amendment is made, it would eventually lead to a sweeping revision of Article 9. These concerns are, however, increasingly limited to a certain generation. Younger Japanese are more likely to decide based on the actually content of the proposal. Japanese opinion polls suggest that a majority of Japanese favor constitutional revision. If we are talking about a “constitutional revision” in general terms, then that already has majority support.

Third, there is the question of Article 9 itself. Public opinion is also evenly divided when it comes to Article 9, although again younger Japanese are more likely to favor a revision. Although younger Japanese look more favorably on China, they are also more likely to support an Article 9 revision.

In any case, the issue of constitutional revision and the issue of revising Article 9 are not the same in Japan. Is revising Article 9 tantamount to immediate “militarization”? Some in Japan worry about changes in how the constitution is interpreted, even without it actually being amended. They argue that the text of the constitution should be made clearer and policies more narrowly defined. As such, not all proponents of revising the constitution are conservatives; some are also liberals who want to see Article 9 revised. This complexity is little understood outside Japan. The simplistic nature of the propaganda from China tends to encourage the thinking that amending the Japanese constitution means an Article 9 revision, which in turn amounts to militarization. The reality is not that simple.

Fourth, there is the question of what incentive Japanese conservatives have to revise Article 9. If the government decides to move ahead, it will need to use considerable political capital, at a cost measured in declining approval ratings. It arguably does not need to accept that cost. The right to collective self-defense has already been recognized in the Legislation for Peace and Security of the 2010s, and future policy adjustments can be achieved simply by revising the legislation package or the “Three Security Documents” (the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program). For the near term at least, it is hard to pinpoint any policy changes that can only be made by revising the constitution.

When asked, successive Liberal Democratic Party administrations have consistently said that they seek to revise the constitution as a key plank of the party platform. The same is true for the Takaichi administration, which has apparently already issued instructions for specific revision procedures. However, the procedural hurdles are high, and the outcome of any discussion in Japan will be quite different depending on what is actually proposed. Whatever the outcome, though, the issue cannot be reduced to a simplistic understanding of an Article 9 revision and subsequent militarization.

KAWASHIMA Shin is a professor at the University of Tokyo.

Japan constitutional amendment

Japanese Defense Policy

Sanae Takaichi constitutional amendment

Sanae Takaichi election

© The Diplomat