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Rubio Gets a Medal. Russia Gets Military Drills. Karakalpakstan Gets Silence.

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21.10.2026

The Debate | Opinion | Central Asia

Rubio Gets a Medal. Russia Gets Military Drills. Karakalpakstan Gets Silence.

Washington celebrates closer ties as Tashkent strengthens its Russian alliance—and offers no announced relief for Karakalpak political prisoners.

On October 19, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev awarded U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio the Order of Outstanding Merit. On October 20, UzDaily reported the arrival of Russian troops for joint military exercises in Uzbekistan. For Karakalpak families awaiting the release of political prisoners, neither announcement offered relief. Uzbekistan celebrated American investment and welcomed Russian soldiers while making no publicly announced commitment to people imprisoned for exercising and defending their rights.

Mirziyoyev’s office announced $12 billion in agreements, while Rubio participated in the C5 1 ministerial meeting and witnessed Uzbekistan’s signing of the Artemis Accords on peaceful space exploration. Sustained American engagement with Central Asia serves legitimate interests, and investment can create opportunities across the region. But announced agreements must still become functioning projects.

The more immediate political benefit went to Mirziyoyev, who received the public appreciation of America’s top diplomat. Rubio wrote that he was “deeply honored to be awarded the Order of Outstanding Merit by President Mirziyoyev” on X. The public results of the visit offered no hint of discussion on Karakalpak prisoners or accountability for the July 2022 massacre in Karakalpakstan.

The Russian exercises make it harder to mistake American access for a strategic shift in Tashkent. According to UzDaily, citing Russia’s Central Military District, servicemen from the 201st Guards Military Base – a Russian base in Tajikistan – arrived for Hamkorlik-2026, scheduled for October 20-27 in Uzbekistan. The report described the participation of assault units, reconnaissance and strike drones, robotic systems, and Mi-24 helicopters. These drills need not have been organized as a message to Washington to illustrate Tashkent’s position. Uzbekistan could welcome an American secretary of state and Russian military personnel in the same week without treating either relationship as a concession to the other.

Mirziyoyev had already explained that position in his own words. During an October 7 birthday call with Putin, he praised the Russian president’s “historic role” in modern Russia and his contribution to their countries’ “comprehensive strategic partnership and alliance.” That same day, he received a delegation led by Denis Manturov to advance cooperation in industry, energy, metallurgy, nuclear energy, and industrial zones. Earlier, Putin had authorized negotiations to amend military-technical agreements with Uzbekistan. RFE/RL reported in August that the proposed changes remained undisclosed. 

Uzbekistan has been equally adept at cultivating other partners. Mirziyoyev signed the charter of President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace in January. His Interior Ministry has described cooperation with Huawei, including plans for “intelligent video surveillance.” In September, an institute under the Agriculture Ministry announced a memorandum with Iran’s Sirang UAV covering agricultural drone training and service centers. That agreement concerns agricultural applications and does not establish military cooperation or imply sanctions evasion, but it does illustrate a developing relationship. Washington should judge its own successes by the commitments it obtains, rather than assume that a warm reception will translate into influence.

The commercial relationship requires the same scrutiny. In April, the EU imposed sanctions on Uzbek companies over their Russia links, citing cotton-cellulose supplies to Russian gunpowder manufacturers. Those findings give U.S. officials concrete reasons to insist on rigorous screening of counterparties, beneficial ownership, and supply chains before promoting investment. Uzbekistan’s political system presents additional concerns: Freedom House rates it “Not Free,” with a score of 12........

© The Diplomat