China Power | Economy | East Asia

China and Mexico: How Far Should Technology Cooperation Go?

The Mexican government is deepening ties with Beijing in some of the sectors most sensitive to U.S. security concerns.

Rosaura Ruiz Gutiérrez, head of Mexico’s Secretariat of Science, Humanities, Technology, and Innovation (Secihti), shakes hands with Chinese Minister of Science and Technology Yin Hejun at the the Ninth Meeting of the Science and Technology Subcommittee of the Mexico-China Permanent Binational Commission, Sep. 6, 2026.

Between July and September 2026, scientific and technological cooperation between Mexico and China gained new momentum. Rosaura Ruiz Gutiérrez, head of Mexico’s Secretariat of Science, Humanities, Technology, and Innovation (Secihti), first met with Chinese Ambassador to Mexico Chen Daojiang and later co-chaired, alongside Chinese Minister of Science and Technology Yin Hejun, the Ninth Meeting of the Science and Technology Subcommittee of the Mexico-China Permanent Binational Commission. Since the mechanism was established in 2004, no Chinese minister of science and technology had personally participated in its meetings.

At the meeting, the two governments signed a memorandum of understanding to expand cooperation among universities, public institutions, and companies in research, digital infrastructure, advanced technology transfer, and public-private partnerships. The areas discussed included artificial intelligence, high-performance computing, robotics, electromobility, and semiconductors. Secihti has also acknowledged that it is exploring opportunities to work with Huawei on high-performance computing, AI, and specialized talent development.

Between Washington and Beijing

These developments come at a particularly difficult moment in Mexico’s relationship with the United States, which is spilling over into China-Mexico relations. 

Since January, the Mexican government has imposed new tariffs on 1,463 product categories originating in countries with which Mexico has no free trade agreement. Although China is not the only country affected, it has borne much of the impact: between January and May, Chinese imports covered by these measures fell by 28.4 percent. In sectors such as footwear and passenger vehicles, the declines reached 59 percent and 35 percent, respectively.

Economy Secretary Marcelo Ebrard has defended these measures as a way to protect Mexican industry. Yet they are difficult to separate from Washington’s pressure over China’s economic presence in Mexico and the upcoming USMCA review. On this issue, Claudia Sheinbaum’s government appears to have chosen to partially accommodate Trump in order to preserve an economic relationship that is exceedingly difficult to replace.

At the same time, Mexico has sought closer political ties with China amid poor treatment from the United States. On September 4, U.S. President Donald Trump declared from the Oval Office that Mexico had “nothing that we really need,” beyond “spicy tamales, tomatoes, a couple of things.” 

Just three days later, Mexico’s Foreign Secretary Roberto Velasco traveled to Beijing to meet with Wang Yi. There, the Chinese foreign minister expressed support for Mexico against “foreign interference” and argued that China-Mexico relations “are not directed at any third party and should not be affected by any third party.” Neither government explicitly mentioned the United States, but both appeared to have it very much in mind.

There is nothing inherently problematic about Mexico seeking to diversify its international relations. If anything, the uncertainty created by Trump demonstrates the risks of depending excessively on a single partner. But if the Mexican government is trying to reduce commercial frictions with Washington, how should we interpret its simultaneous deepening of ties with Beijing in some of the sectors most sensitive to U.S. security concerns?

The Risks of Technology Cooperation

Recent exchanges between Secihti and its Chinese counterparts reveal at least three particularly problematic areas. The first concerns the technologies chosen for deeper cooperation. Artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and high-performance computing – all explicitly discussed during these meetings – are not ordinary industries. They are at the heart of the China-U.S. competition to achieve greater technological autonomy, control supply chains, and preserve industrial and military advantages.........

© The Diplomat