The current fighting between Israel and Hezbollah began as a side front in the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran. But it is fast becoming more central to Israel’s overall combat efforts and strategic objectives.

Since March 2, 2026 — when Hezbollah fired missiles into Israel in solidarity with Iran — Israel has bombarded Hezbollah’s strongholds across the country, called for the evacuation of the civilian population from south Lebanon in preparation for a ground invasion, and bombed bridges across the Litani River to prevent Hezbollah from transferring forces to the south. It has also struck in locations, particularly in central Beirut, that have long been thought safe from Israeli attacks on Hezbollah. All told, over a million Lebanese have been displaced and hundreds killed – including many civilians.

Public discussions in Israel now center around the possibility of a temporary occupation of south Lebanon and a military operation that would supposedly deal a final blow to Hezbollah.

As a historian of Lebanon and Israel relations, I have studied decades of successive military engagements by Israel that have attempted, and failed, to put an end to Lebanese-based armed groups that fight Israel. I see no reason why that past will not repeat itself should Israel reoccupy south Lebanon. Moreover, such an action risks preventing favorable conditions for a historic dialogue between the governments of the two countries, which are both united by a desire to disarm Hezbollah and strengthen Lebanon’s state capacities.

Since the late 1960s, when Palestinian guerrillas began using Lebanon as a base to launch their armed struggle to liberate Palestine, Israel has accused the Lebanese government and its armed forces of not doing enough to prevent nonstate actors from using the country as a base to attack Israel.

In March 1978, three years into the Lebanese Civil War, Israel occupied south Lebanon for the first time in an effort to push back Palestinian........

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