On February 12, Bangladesh held elections for the first time since the ouster of longtime leader Sheikh Hasina in August 2024. Voters delivered a supermajority in parliament to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and approved a referendum on the proposed July Charter reforms. South Asian Voices spoke with Dr. Muhib Rahman on February 18 to unpack the election results and survey the path forward for the embattled democracy. Rahman is a Perry World House Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania where he works on the “Borders and Boundaries Project.” His broader research agenda sits at the intersection of international security, emerging technologies, and the politics of the Global South.

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) received nearly 50 percent of all votes cast and won a supermajority in the Jatiya Sangsad (JS). What contributed to the party’s success and how did this result compare with expectations heading into the election?

The BNP is one of the two key political parties in Bangladesh, with a large popular base since its establishment by former President Ziaur Rahman. Given that the Awami League (AL) did not participate, following its government’s widespread repression for about 15 years, and that the BNP has been on the ground all throughout trying to act as the de facto opposition, I think the result was quite expected.

In the run-up to the election, there was some hype that Jamaat-e-Islami (Jamaat), along with the National Citizen Party (NCP), the party born out of the July Revolution, would do much better than they eventually did. Some polls suggested the BNP would win a landslide majority, while others said the election would be a very close contest between the BNP and the Jamaat-led alliance.

Part of the reason the BNP was successful, I think, was that its election manifesto and campaigns resonated with the expectations of the population across the social spectrum. For instance, they have come up with the idea of a “Family Card” to deliver economic benefits to low-income families, which I think people, especially in rural areas, could connect with. Jamaat, on the other hand, was able to attract voters by campaigning against corruption and promising good governance and efficient policies, but this appeal was more to specific segments, such as the youth and the urban middle class.

The competition may have looked like a pretty close call because people were paying attention to social media, and the segment of society engaging there was urban, educated youth sharing their opinions on politics. But that does not represent the entire picture of the nation. So, Jamaat did well at attracting urban, educated people and the young voters, but overall, people were more aligned with the BNP.

In addition, the death of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, the mother of Tarique Rahman, generated a period of sympathy because she was a leader who commanded respect across the political spectrum.

Jamaat received the second highest share of votes (nearly 32 percent) and will lead the opposition coalition. The party leadership has accepted the outcome but called for investigations into alleged irregularities in at least 32 seats. How will these allegations shape the post-election environment?

As I noted, Jamaat had this hype in the run-up to the election, and the party was expecting to perform much better than it did. So, these allegations came about partly because of the gap between expectations and results. Jamaat believed there were some irregularities, particularly in the vote-counting stage. Initially, they wanted to respond with some form of demonstration, but over time, that has stabilized, and they have accepted the outcome.

Even if Jamaat and the NCP are not happy with what happened in the election, I think they are expected to act more like an opposition that helps the government maintain stability. There are many positive developments on the BNP side as well, such as Tarique Rahman visiting the residences of the Jamaat leader and the leader of the NCP. So, I think there is an effort on all sides to build a broader coalition to govern the country constructively, rather than creating some sort of political friction. I believe any problems that may arise in the future will not be related to those allegations, and it will not be a big issue down the road.

However, the problem may arise regarding the referendum. The elected members of the BNP were supposed to take an oath as both Members of Parliament and Members of the Constitution Reform Council, but they did not. By contrast, Jamaat did take the oath for both. It will create challenges if the BNP tries to bypass the reform agenda approved by the referendum, as Jamaat and the NCP will push that agenda forward in parliament.

We have yet to see how that pans out, because I think the BNP is now testing how everyone reacts to their initial postures and how much they can get away with. But if they take an anti-referendum stance, we have to see whether Jamaat and the NCP can mobilize public support to force the government to implement some reforms.

“[If the BNP] take an anti-referendum stance, we have to see whether Jamaat and the NCP can mobilize public support to force the government to implement some reforms.”

“[If the BNP] take an anti-referendum stance, we have to see whether Jamaat and the NCP can mobilize public support to force the government to implement some reforms.”

The July Charter referendum passed with over 60 percent of the vote in favor, but—in practice—implementation of the July Charter proposals will depend on the BNP government. How do you foresee Rahman navigating the implementation of the July Charter in view of this referendum result?

There were some issues from the very beginning. The BNP had reservations about several key propositions in the referendum, including the bar on a single leader serving as both party head and head of government, and the proposal for a bicameral legislature based on proportional representation. As a result, the way the referendum was bundled did not fully align with the BNP’s preferences.

So, there has been some expectation that the BNP’s behavior upon taking office would depend on how it performs in the election. Given that the party won a two-thirds majority, many would expect it to try to avoid the referendum proposals as much as possible. If the BNP had fewer than 200 seats and lacked the supermajority needed to change the constitution, the opposition parties might have more leverage to push it towards reform.

Even the popular base that supported the BNP during the election does not fully align with the referendum. A significant segment of BNP supporters actually voted against the referendum. Tarique Rahman, in the later stages of his campaign, asked supporters to vote in favor of the referendum for electoral reasons. But a tacit understanding that they would contest some of its tenets if they won was always there.

There will be some pressure from the international community, especially the United States, on the BNP to stick to the reform agenda. But I think they will pick and choose what they implement, depending on how effectively Jamaat and the NCP can push for these reforms in parliament.

Despite considerable concerns heading into the election, the security environment appeared to remain largely stable as Bangladesh went to the polls. How did the country achieve a mostly peaceful election after months of tension and sporadic political violence? How does that success augur for the post-election period?

There were multiple factors. One was definitely the role of law enforcement agencies. About 900,000 law enforcement and logistics support personnel were deployed nationwide. They did a pretty good job, and we have seen reports of the military being neutral and not favoring any party. Some allegations against the police surfaced, but overall, the police were fairly neutral and effective in maintaining law and order. There was also a strong commitment on the part of the interim government to conduct the elections peacefully and successfully; they were very serious about it from the very beginning.

Another important factor was that political parties acted quite responsibly throughout the election day, despite some sporadic incidents. In the run-up to the election, it was reported that the BNP faced significant infighting. When Tarique Rahman returned to Bangladesh from the self-imposed exile in the United Kingdom, he tried to restore order and present a strong front to prevent any clashes, not only within the party but also with the opposition. Jamaat and the NCP also showed tolerance and restraint, even when tension could have escalated into violence.

There was also a sort of “festival” mood that everyone was happy about the very fact that they were able to cast their vote after so many rigged and sham elections that deprived a generation of their voting rights. So, this election meant a lot to young voters, and they were highly active in fostering that celebratory mood.

One could also see this election as the continuation of the July movement. After Hasina’s fall, young people came out into the streets to restore law and order. Everyone has that memory of being a responsible part of society, even in turbulent times, and knows not to create chaos and unrest.

Ahead of the election, many observers wondered how Awami League (AL) supporters—whose party was banned from the poll—would vote, if at all. Do we have any indication of how AL supporters expressed themselves during this election cycle?

To answer this question, we need to understand how the Awami League’s popular base is constituted. The core supporters who were the key recipients of benefits and complicit in the perpetration of violence during the Hasina era are not currently present in Bangladesh. They had to flee and are now mostly residing in India. Many others who are still in the country are not in a very good position to create unrest or commit violence, as investigations and lawsuits are ongoing against them. They were least likely to cast their vote.

However, most of the Awami League’s supporters are not actually as loyal as people might think. Many of them were frustrated by the Awami League’s repressive rule of the country. We saw people not blindly supporting the party during the Hasina era, and many changing sides in the run-up to the February elections. So, the expectation that banning the Awami League from participating in the election would disenfranchise or limit people’s participation did not materialize, as a significant segment of the Awami League’s support base still participated.

The Awami League’s supporters mostly voted for the BNP because they had more disagreements with Jamaat. Some polls run up to the election show that about 50 percent of Awami League supporters who planned to vote would vote for the BNP. That appears to be the case during the elections. Awami League supporters include, among other groups, Hindu minorities and people who are on the political left. I think most of them would prefer the BNP to be in power rather than the Jamaat-e-Islami or the NCP.

But there are some local dynamics where I see why some Awami League supporters might also switch to voting for Jamaat. The reason relates to patronage politics over who controls certain sources of rent, especially who gets a share of the resources seized by Awami League supporters during the Hasina regime, and how that ownership changes. With that dynamic, people who acquired wealth during the previous regime might choose to rely more on Jamaat for the protection of their property.

The fact that there was about a 60 percent turnout clearly indicated that a good portion of Awami League supporters actually voted. However, regarding the referendum, I would say their likely preference was “no.” A considerable share of more than 30 percent of the vote that was “no,” I think, came from Awami League voters.

Tarique Rahman was sworn in as Bangladesh’s prime minister on February 17. What will Rahman’s first priorities be as the country’s new leader? Which significant challenges will he face in the coming weeks and months?

The main priority for Tarique Rahman is economic development. He made it clear that he wanted to make Bangladesh a trillion-dollar economy over the next decade or so.

On foreign policy, he wants to bring stability and normalize relations with countries like India, with which Bangladesh has been increasingly having problems. He says he will maintain good relations with everyone. During the interim government, there was a clear tilt toward China, with the mega-deals and state visits, as well as toward Pakistan. Tarique Rahman seems to be trying to put a check on that by setting expectations for normalization and stability during his term.

We have also seen international goodwill for Rahman immediately after the elections. India congratulated him immediately, and the United States expressed its very serious interest in engaging with him—take, for example, the remarks by Ambassador Christensen indicating U.S. willingness to help with alternative defense procurement over China.

If you look at the cabinet choices of Tarique Rahman, the foreign minister whom he appointed served in the later phase of the interim government. He is continuing in that position. That signals many things, including that U.S.-Bangladesh relations are a priority, unlike during the early phases of the interim government, which seemed to favor China.

Domestically, I think his priority is rebuilding the country. Importantly, there have been many issues with creating opportunities for youth; that was one of the main reasons the previous government fell. Law and order are another issue, especially considering the interim government’s lack of effectiveness in containing crimes and violence throughout the country.

Something else that is not discussed as much but will be a major challenge for Tarique Rahman is patronage politics. The issue of corruption is very difficult to manage because local politics is organized around patronage, where local party members benefit from those networks. Jamaat, in particular, capitalized on this by campaigning against corruption in the run-up to the election. So, coming up with political arrangements that will maintain stability and the satisfaction of party members while also minimizing corruption and the people’s frustration will, I think, be one of the key priorities for Tarique Rahman.

“[C]oming up with political arrangements that will maintain stability and the satisfaction of party members while also minimizing corruption and the people’s frustration will, I think, be one of the key priorities for Tarique Rahman.”

“[C]oming up with political arrangements that will maintain stability and the satisfaction of party members while also minimizing corruption and the people’s frustration will, I think, be one of the key priorities for Tarique Rahman.”

Jamaat appeared to perform strongly on the western border with India. What explains their success in this geographic area, and how might these dynamics spillover into upcoming Indian state elections in West Bengal and Assam?

That is a very important issue. I think the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is already trying to capitalize on the fact that the Jamaat did very well in districts bordering India. The storyline of Jamaat doing better is, to some extent, about anti-Indianism. How harsh and inhumane India sometimes becomes on the India-Bangladesh border has made people very anti-Indian in the frontier regions. Jamaat did well in border regions because of border killings, and because of how India is perceived, as much as due to the lack of a stronghold of the large parties like the BNP.

The reason why Jamaat has done better is the same reason why the BJP, on the other side, might be doing better in the next election in West Bengal. This is mutually reinforcing: when Bangladesh reacts in a way that India finds threatening, India uses that to capitalize on getting more support for the more conservative party, like the BJP. There will definitely be some ramifications in the upcoming state elections. Most significantly, I think the BJP will become more popular in West Bengal.

Looking forward, what is necessary for Bangladesh to translate this relatively smooth election into an enduring democratic transition? What should SAV readers pay attention to in the coming months?

The main fear among the populace in Bangladesh was that the return of the BNP to power would recreate the same cycle we had seen in the Hasina era, in which her party held a parliamentary majority, gradually curtailed democratic expression, and pursued autocratic consolidation over time. People still have that fear, given that the BNP has gained a two-thirds majority and has already signaled that it might not honor the referendum.

The good thing, however, is that young people in Bangladesh make up about 40 percent of the voting-eligible population. We have seen in the July Revolution that they will, if needed, go on to the streets and force a repressive regime to fall. I think this sends a very strong message to anyone in power, and that will put some limits on how they govern.

So, I do not expect the BNP to go in the same direction that the Awami League did. They know that social media activism and people’s growing awareness of their rights will make it much more difficult to run the country the way it was before. Things will change no matter who is in power, and the BNP will be under strong public scrutiny and pressure from young people and civil society not to move in that direction.

More broadly, there needs to be long-term reforms, as proposed in the July Charter. Limiting the power of the prime minister is particularly important. The prime minister is overwhelmingly powerful in Bangladesh, leading to a tendency toward the creation of a personalist regime within a democratically elected government. That is what we saw with Sheikh Hasina.

So, the thing people need to pay close attention to is how the reform will unfold over the next five years. If we see significant pushbacks around that, I think that will open the possibility of political instability and uprisings of a similar scale or pattern to July 2024.

We also have to see how the proposal for a bicameral legislature plays out. As it is right now, because of the two-thirds majority, the BNP can do anything it wants in parliament. But if there is an effective, proportionally represented upper house in parliament, that might allow the opposition to play a stronger role and help keep the BNP in check. So, it is about reforms and whether the BNP governs the country without being tempted to consolidate power in an autocratic fashion.

Of course, foreign relations will also be important. India’s influence is enduring in Bangladesh, and domestic politics is often polarized by the government’s foreign entanglements. There is always some attempt to stabilize and balance. But we see that governments with a super majority tend to align with India, because that sort of extends the shadow of the future for them. Succumbing to that temptation would be another trap for the BNP.

Views expressed are the interviewee’s own and do not necessarily reflect the positions of South Asian Voices, the Stimson Center, or our supporters.

Also Read: The Other Half of Democracy: Governing and Opposing in Bangladesh’s Democratic Transition

Image 1: Press Information Department of Bangladesh

Image 2: ROCKY via Wikimedia Commons

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