Last year in Rome, I spent five months in the research unit at NATO Defence College (NDC), NATO’s senior educational institution for civilian and military officials. The College is where these experienced officials come to study and debate some of the alliance’s hardest strategic problems. That experience matters now because the Arctic is testing exactly that part of NATO: its ability to build coherence under pressure.

As NATO heads toward its July summit in Ankara, Türkiye, and as European allies prepare for the possibility of less U.S. participation, the High North is no longer a side issue. It has become a test of alliance coherence under pressure. Not because war there is imminent. But because the region brings together several of NATO’s hardest problems at once. Sovereignty. Infrastructure. Ambiguity. Consultation. Internal strain.

Canada sits in the middle of that problem. Its challenge is not just to respond to these shifts, but to align its role within the alliance with how it coordinates security at home. Ottawa is more involved in European security than it was only a few years ago, and it has deepened cooperation with Nordic allies. It is part of the coalition supporting Ukraine. It now speaks more openly about Arctic resilience and information sharing with NATO. The question is no longer whether Canada is involved. It is whether Canada is ready to shape what comes next.

The Arctic as a Test of Alliance Coherence

For years, the Arctic was treated as important but relatively stable. Even after Russia’s 2007 flag-planting at the North Pole, the dominant view in many Western capitals was that the region would remain governed by practical cooperation, low tension, and existing legal frameworks. That assumption is harder to sustain now. Russia’s war against Ukraine has sharply reduced the space for Arctic cooperation with Moscow. China’s role has also become harder to dismiss. It is not a military Arctic power on Russia’s level, but it has shown a sustained interest in Arctic shipping routes, research, infrastructure, and governance. Climate change is changing the region too. In some places, reduced sea ice is making access easier for longer periods. But it is also making conditions more unpredictable and raising risks for infrastructure, communities, and emergency response.

When the United States treats Greenland as negotiable and uses tariff pressure against European allies, the issue stops being abstract. It becomes a test of alliance cohesion. The pressure is not only external. It can come from within.

This matters because NATO has long relied on ambiguity to manage internal differences. Ambiguity buys time. It lets allies preserve unity while avoiding harder choices. In the Arctic, that has meant keeping NATO’s role flexible and politically underdefined. Some allies have wanted a stronger NATO role in the region. Others have been more cautious, worried about escalation, sovereignty sensitivities, or preserving room........

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