Avtar Singh Bhasin, at 90, remains indefatigable. His latest book, Negotiating India’s Landmark Agreements, published by Penguin Random House India, establishes his credibility as a prolific writer and chronicler of India’s international engagements and agreements.

Bhasin’s meticulous research is evident in his latest book, in which he examines five key agreements: the 1954 India-China Agreement (also known as the Panchsheel Agreement), the Indo–Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation (1971), the Simla Agreement between India and Pakistan (1972), the India–Sri Lanka Accord (1987), and the India–United States Civil Nuclear Energy Agreement (2008)—each of which has had profound implications for Indian foreign policy.

More than seven decades on, Bhasin has raised important issues concerning the 1954 Agreement that redefined the Indian position on Tibet. It was, after all, the first attempt by India and China to reset bilateral ties following their emergence as newly founded states. The failure of the 17-point agreement between China and Tibet was accompanied by foment, and the former tightening its vice-like grip on the latter. China had been pressing for India’s recognition of Tibet as part of China. This was achieved through the 1954 agreement.

Two years before concluding the Panchsheel Agreement, India had already downgraded its Mission in Lhasa in 1952 to the level of a Consulate General (it was finally shut down in 1962), surrendered its British-era extra-territorial privileges in Tibet, such as its postal, telegraph, telephone infrastructure and wayside rest houses. It had also withdrawn its military escorts at trade marts in Tibet.

India did not use these concessions or the fact of according recognition to the “Tibet Region of China" as a bargaining tool for settling the border dispute, which had already reared its ugly head by then.

The instructions given to the Indian delegation by the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru were that they should not raise the border dispute during the 1954 negotiations. The Chinese, in any case, were not interested in raising the issue since they were busy consolidating their position in Tibet and Aksai Chin, where they had already started constructing the G219 highway.

On the question of trade between Tibet and Ladakh and the use of certain passes like the Rudok pass, the Chinese adroitly linked the Ladakh trade issue to the resolution of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan.

The decision not to discuss the border dispute during the negotiations over the 1954 agreement led to considerable legacy issues between India and China. The 1954 agreement was valid for........

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