Bharat is gripped by euphoria and an ecstatic moment of glory, accorded to it by its ‘last bastion of diplomacy’—the Indian Armed Forces—through Operation Sindoor. Typically, when diplomacy fails, options diminish and the ‘share price’ of the nation drops; or when calamities occur and precious lives need saving; or when an enemy threatens conflict and we need to nip it in the bud—like any other nation, Bharat looks up to its ‘scholar warriors’ in uniform to deliver with unflinching commitment, dedication, and dependability—qualities often rare in most other organisations. This time too, Bharat rides a ‘wave of glory’ on the back of its military might.

For far too long, the rise of bureaucracy—craftily keeping the polity close while gradually excluding the armed forces from decisions affecting national power, all the while enhancing the roles and remuneration of themselves and sister organisations like the police—has created a ‘silent pain’ in the men and women who serve in uniform. From being constantly relegated in the Warrant of Precedence, to curated and structured organisations initiated by the armed forces being made bereft of military presence, to being served a raw deal on matters of pay and pensions, the acuteness of the ailment has grown to a level where civilian officials have started seeking credit for military operations and now attempt to control them through a lens that will always be shaded and coloured.

We have witnessed a few wars with Pakistan and China, winning all against Pakistan and losing one against China. That loss came with heavy sacrifices by the armed forces, who were ill-equipped, and the government could not even kit them with the basics at the time. The victories came with their own share of gains, much of which—especially after the 1971 war—was undone as we returned large tracts of land to Pakistan along with their prisoners of war, while ours never came back. Kargil saw the resolute bravery of our armed forces in the most trying terrain conditions, marked by great sacrifice, and yet, besides celebrating that victory, we have left some decisions unaccounted for, with low bureaucratic responsibility and no continuity in political intent.

Today, we have made history by crippling Pakistan’s will with just three days of effective targeting. While the future remains uncertain—owing to the irrationality of Pakistan and the support it receives from foreign enemies of Bharat and the deep state that has transformed an ideologically-handicapped country into a terror-infused, venomous snake—Bharat feels secure that its armed forces will deliver and its political leadership will take the right decisions.

During the preparatory phase of this operation, Prime Minister Modi held consultations with the CDS and the Service Chiefs together, and on two occasions directly and separately with the Chiefs of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and Indian Navy (IN). While those meetings were held behind closed doors, one can hypothesise that the outspoken Chiefs gave the Prime Minister a clear account of capabilities and deficiencies, so that a prudent decision could be made. That alone would have led to a game plan for precision strikes, with conventional aspects kept on a slight backburner to ensure full preparedness, in case war is thrust upon Bharat.

While many lessons have been drawn from the wars and skirmishes Bharat has faced, let us draw conclusions from a different perspective—by examining three distinct scenarios our nation has undergone—to understand where we stand and what we must do.

This was a full-fledged war, for which we had to wait and prepare in order to liberate Bangladesh. However, the war began with Pakistan launching air strikes on our airfields with the commencement of Operation ‘Chengiz Khan’.

In this war, Bharat was engaged on two fronts and had limited air superiority. Since the Army Chief at the time had requested time to prepare—beginning in April 1971—and wanted to avoid launching an offensive during the monsoon season in Bangladesh, the Prime Minister agreed. This decision by the Armed Forces supported the broader political calculations. An offensive in December also strategically negated the possibility of China opening a front through Tibet.

Prior to the war, the Soviet Union had issued warnings to Pakistan. While General Yahya Khan declared a state of emergency on 23 November 1971, the war formally began on 3 December 1971 with a surprise aerial attack on Indian airfields by the Pakistan Air Force.

The key strategy was to contain Pakistan and capture Dhaka through a decisive offensive.

The United States became involved to limit Soviet influence in the region. At that time, its ally China was also a close partner of Pakistan. The US floated a resolution at the UN Security Council on 8 December 1971 calling for a ceasefire, which was vetoed by the Soviet Union.

In this war, the US urged China to mobilise its forces along the border, but China did not........

© News18