UN Resolution on Human Rights in the DPRK: South Korea Participates

Having become a co-author of the UN resolution on human rights in North Korea, the Republic of Korea has taken another step that has significantly reduced the chances of restoring inter-Korean dialogue.

Discord in Seoul’s approaches

It is worth recalling here that although the most significant change in Seoul’s foreign policy under Lee Jae Myung was a more liberal policy towards North Korea, at least supposedly, there is a substantial discord within this political line, with the Ministry of Unification pulling in one direction and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Security Council pulling in the other.

The Ministry of Unification, led by Chung Dong-young, for whom it is the second time holding the post (it was he who organised the 2007 summit between Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Jong-il), on the one hand puts forward quite sensible ideas, such as recognising North Korea as a hostile but separate state (similar to what the DPRK has already done with regard to the South). But on the other hand, most of the ministry’s initiatives look as if it is still 2007 and the situation has not changed at all.

The ministry is trying to ‘crack’ Pyongyang’s unwillingness to talk to Seoul with the help of third parties. Seeking mediation between the North and the South, Seoul has turned not only to Russia or China, but recently also to the European Union. On 1 April in Seoul, during a meeting with a delegation of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs led by its chair David McAllister, Chung Dong-young asked the European Union to consider the possibility of joining a political dialogue aimed at easing inter-Korean tensions in a ‘2+1’ format – the two Koreas and the European Union. ‘I would be grateful if the European Union would consider facilitating a political dialogue between South and North Korea,’ adding that the EU’s experience in resolving centuries-old enmity and achieving regional integration makes it an ‘optimal mediator’.

To what extent states such as Poland or other countries unfriendly to Russia and the DPRK could play the role of mediators is not merely a debatable issue; it begs the question of which alternative planet Minister Chung lives on.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs adheres to a more traditional stance. Although it is not referring to the North as an enemy, trying to refrain from harsh anti-North Korean rhetoric, it is still present. Anti-North Korean exercises are conducted not only under the ‘umbrella’ of the large joint US-South Korean ‘Freedom Shield’ exercises, but they also continue to take place independently, and on a considerable scale.

Moreover, some of them are quite commemorative in nature. For instance, relatively recently President Lee Jae Myung spoke prior to the onset of such exercises and talked about the courage of South Korean soldiers who stood up to ‘North Korean provocations in the West (Yellow) Sea.’ As Lee stated, ‘the firm defence of our people and the territory of the ROK through strong national defence and the creation of a peaceful Korean Peninsula free from the fear of war is a historical mission left to us by the heroes who defended the Yellow Sea’. ‘Our task is to turn the sea that soldiers protected at the cost of their lives from a “line of conflict and confrontation” into a “ground for peace and prosperity”,’ the head of state emphasised.

This refers to the disputed maritime border that the North Koreans ignore, and as a result, this area has been a periodic site of clashes initiated by both sides. But the important thing is that President Lee did not hesitate to raise the issue, and it was also heard in Pyongyang.

Human Rights Resolution: A Wake-Up Call

The main event that prompted the author to compose the article is the resolution on human rights in the DPRK. Every year, the UN adopts resolutions on human rights in North Korea at the Human Rights Council in the first half of the year and at the UN General Assembly in the second half. Such a resolution comprises a listing of North Korea’s ‘sins’ and demands to repent and straighten up. For obvious reasons, it is ritualistic in nature, since the probability that Pyongyang will be ashamed and do as it is told to do amounts to zero. However, what is more important for us is the extent to which the Republic of Korea participates in activities of the kind.

Such resolutions have been adopted since 2005. Seoul was a co-author from 2008 to 2018, but refrained from doing so from 2019 to 2021 under the relatively liberal administration of Moon Jae-in, which wished to resume inter-Korean dialogue. Under the conservative Yoon Suk-yeol and during the interregnum of 2023-25, the ROK also supported the resolution.

And what about the presidency of Lee Jae Myung? While conservative media in the ROK assessed co-authorship as a ‘principled step’ confirming that ‘human rights cannot be traded for dialogue with the DPRK’, some experts claim that the Lee government from the very beginning of his term refrained from participating as a co-author and fought against this decision until the very end, ‘taking into account the possibility of reviving dialogue with North Korea and the need to strengthen inter-Korean trust’. In any case, such ideas were publicly voiced by Minister Jeong.

Realists, however, noted that ‘North Korea’s hostile policy towards the South has become so entrenched that refraining from adopting a human rights resolution would do little to change inter-Korean relations’, and that it is not worth irritating the United States without a necessity.

And so, on 31 March 2026, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution on the human rights situation in North Korea, co-authored by South Korea and 49 other countries. As usual, the resolution ‘in the strongest possible terms’ condemns the longstanding and systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations in North Korea and calls on the North to ‘immediately take all the steps’ necessary to end such crimes, to release those who have been arbitrarily detained (meaning the pastor-spies, about whom the author has written repeatedly), and to resume the reunification of Korean families separated by the 1950-53 Korean War.

As reported by the South Korean foreign ministry, the decision was taken in order to improve the human rights situation of North Korean residents in practice. And Chung Dong-young, who had previously spoken out against co-authorship, stated that the decision by South Korea to become a co-author of the UN human rights resolution on North Korea this year ‘can be regarded as a compromise between respecting the UN’s role in representing universal values and taking into account the other side’s position on issues that it believes relate to its sovereignty.’ At the same time, in Chung’s view, the government’s policy of maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula remains unaltered.

Here it is possible to trace an unpleasant parallel with South Korea’s vote in the UN Security Council when it came to banning the glorification of Nazism: conservatives voted against, Democrats abstained, and under the formally democratic Lee Jae Myung, South Korea voted like the conservatives.

However, the Russian topic also appeared here. In her speech during the high-level segment of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, Second Deputy Foreign Minister of South Korea Kang Insun called on the international community to pay attention to the human rights problem in the DPRK precisely amidst ‘illegal military cooperation’ between North Korea and Russia.

Pyongyang has strongly condemned the resolution. As noted in a statement by the DPRK Foreign Ministry published on 2 April by KCNA, ‘the adoption of this anti-DPRK resolution is a serious political provocation against the dignity and sovereignty of the DPRK’. The UN system targeting individual states constitutes ‘an act of hostility contradicting the principle of non-interference in internal affairs enshrined in the UN Charter’. ‘The practice of adopting such anti-DPRK “human rights resolution” which has lasted for 20-odd years is epitome fully showing the deplorable present situation of the UN human rights arena extremely polluted by politicization, selectivity and double standards,’ the North Korean Foreign Ministry’s statement said, pointing out that human rights violations should be looked for in the Middle East, where ‘massacres are taking place one after another, eclipsing the inhuman crimes committed during the Second World War, and children, who in all cases should be the object of special attention, become targets of precision-guided weapons, resulting in the deaths of hundreds and dozens of children’.

Both at the 9th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea and at the subsequent session of the Supreme People’s Assembly, North Korea set out its course towards the ROK in a quite harsh fashion. On 24 March 2026, delivering a keynote speech at the first session of the 15th Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK, the North Korean leader stated that the ROK is a ‘hostile state’ that will face ruthless consequences in case of any provocation.

However, there are important details worth recalling. On the one hand, South Korea is a separate hostile state, not a part of Northern territory illegally seized by pro-American puppets. If just ten years ago the use of South Korea’s state name by anyone in the North could be regarded as a political crime that undermines the thesis of ‘one Korea’, today the term ‘South Korea’ (Hanguk) is used by Kim Jong-un himself and other senior leaders. And this, to put it mildly, significantly reduces – to nearly zero – the likelihood of a second Korean War. On the other hand, the Republic of Korea is demonstratively ignored by Pyongyang as a state deprived of subjectivity and fundamentally incapable of negotiation, regardless of who is in power: conservatives are open enemies, Democrats are hypocrites who try to achieve the same goals but by more cunning means.

One can assume that further demonstrative gestures aimed at engaging the North in dialogue will be accompanied by real steps that will make that dialogue less and less realistic.

Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading Research Fellow at the Centre for Korean Studies, Institute of China and Contemporary Asia, Russian Academy of Sciences

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