Concerns over nuclear safeguards and the boundary between civilian and military applications of atomic technology have intensified following recent remarks by International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi regarding India’s Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor at Kalpakkam.

Speaking during engagements at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Grossi praised the “impressive progress” of the reactor and reiterated the Agency’s willingness to support India’s ambitious plan to expand nuclear energy capacity to 100 gigawatts by 2047. His comments have triggered renewed debate over the adequacy and consistency of international safeguards in fast-evolving nuclear programmes.

The Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor is part of India’s long-term three-stage nuclear strategy aimed at eventually utilising thorium-based fuel cycles. However, India has not placed the reactor under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, citing strategic considerations. Several other facilities within India’s nuclear programme also remain outside international inspection regimes.

India is reported to operate a total of eleven unsafeguarded nuclear reactors, including two under construction. These are distributed across three main sites. At the Madras Atomic Power Station in Kalpakkam, there are three reactors: Madras Atomic Power Plant-1 and 2, each with a capacity of 220 megawatts, along with the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor with a capacity of 500 megawatts.

At the Kaiga Generating Station, six reactors are located: Kaiga Atomic Power Project units 1, 2, 3 and 4, each rated at 220 megawatts, while units 5 and 6 are under construction with a projected capacity of 700 megawatts each. At the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, two reactors—Tarapur Atomic Power Plant 3 and 4—operate with capacities of 540 megawatts each.

Analysts note that the partial application of safeguards across India’s nuclear infrastructure has long been a point of concern for non-proliferation observers, particularly given the dual-use nature of breeder and heavy water reactor technologies, which can produce fissile material alongside electricity generation. Critics argue that such asymmetry complicates verification efforts regarding the diversion of nuclear material for non-civilian purposes, while Indian authorities maintain that robust domestic controls are in place.

Attention has also focused on regulatory and security frameworks, with questions periodically raised about institutional independence and historical reports of illicit trafficking involving radioactive material. Although these incidents have been officially disputed in terms of scale and interpretation, they continue to feature in international assessments of nuclear security practices.

The International Atomic Energy Agency’s approach to engaging with expanding nuclear programmes has further intensified debate over the balance between promoting civilian nuclear energy and enforcing non-proliferation standards. Observers caution that the uneven application of safeguards risks weakening established global norms.

Fast breeder reactor technology, while central to long-term fuel cycle ambitions, has faced technical and operational challenges internationally, including safety concerns in previous programmes in other countries.

As nuclear expansion accelerates globally, the issue underscores a broader challenge for the international system: maintaining credible verification and transparency mechanisms in programmes that straddle the line between civilian energy development and potential strategic capability.

© Naya Daur