No modern state has suffered as much as Iraq in trying to define the meaning of sovereignty since 2003. Here, “sovereignty” is not a constitutional principle but a definitional trap—one that grows more convoluted as the conflict between the United States and Iran deepens, and as Iraq turns into an open arena where three actors fight on its soil while the state itself stands outside the frame.

At the very moment US forces strike Iran‑aligned militias, Iran launches attacks inside Iraq under the pretext of targeting American interests, while Iraqi proxy groups retaliate by hitting US diplomatic sites and military facilities within the country. Iraq thus becomes the only state in the region bombed by two foreign powers and used by a third, while its caretaker government—led by Mohammed Shia’ al‑Sudani—possesses neither the military capacity to respond to American or Iranian strikes nor the authority to rein in the militias supposedly integrated into its security apparatus.

This paradox has left the very notion of Iraqi sovereignty in a state of chronic clinical illness. The Financial Times quoted an Iraqi official commenting on US strikes: “They didn’t ask for our permission.” A sentence that distills the entire dilemma: a country whose territory is violated without consultation, and armed groups that behave as if they were states within the state.

The problem is not the strikes alone, but the political architecture that has rendered Iraq incapable of imposing a single definition of sovereignty. As The Washington Post notes, Iraq lives in a “gray zone” between Washington and Tehran, where no Iraqi government can take an independent decision without it being interpreted in one capital or the other as an act of alignment.

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Renad Mansour, director of the Iraq Initiative at Chatham House, puts it bluntly: “Iran’s strategy now is to create chaos and raise the costs of this war… and it can do that easily in Iraq.” A precise description of a country that has become a soft zone where American and Iranian interests intersect while Baghdad’s authority recedes. Since the US–Israeli strike inside Iran on 28th February, drone and rocket attacks on American interests in Iraq have surged, targeting bases at Baghdad and Erbil airports and U.S. diplomatic facilities. Washington has responded with strikes on militia bases—a parallel conflict unfolding entirely on Iraqi soil.

Iran and its allied factions have expanded their attacks to include oil fields and energy infrastructure, seeking to raise the economic cost on Washington and its partners. This is where the danger becomes existential: Iraq depends almost entirely on oil, and any disruption in production or exports through the Strait of Hormuz could trigger an immediate collapse in state revenues. Bloomberg describes Iraq as “the most vulnerable country in the region to any shock in the oil market,” because its economy has no alternatives and its government relies on oil revenues to pay salaries and fund public spending. With every strike, Baghdad’s ability to protect its economic interests—and its political sovereignty—shrinks further.

Most of Iraq’s Shiite militias were formed after the 2003 US invasion, though some date back decades. Analysts estimate their combined manpower at more than 100,000 fighters, many of whom receive salaries from the very state whose sovereignty they undermine.

This raises the question every Iraqi government avoids: How can a state defend its sovereignty when part of its armed forces owes allegiance to a power beyond its borders?

This raises the question every Iraqi government avoids: How can a state defend its sovereignty when part of its armed forces owes allegiance to a power beyond its borders?

The New York Times has described Iraq as a “state with diminished sovereignty,” because its security decision‑making is divided among three actors: the government, the militias, and Tehran. Washington, for its part, treats Iraq as a theater of confrontation with Iran, not as a state with an independent will.

The United States previously opposed the nomination of Nouri al‑Maliki and today expresses doubts about Sudani’s ability to restrain powerful armed groups. Iran, meanwhile, treats Iraq as strategic depth rather than a sovereign neighbour. Thus, the prime minister finds himself in an unenviable position: he holds the office but not the tools; the formal legitimacy but not the executive capacity; the rhetoric of sovereignty but not the means to enforce it.

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The question in Iraq is no longer: Who violates sovereignty? but rather: Is there anything left to violate? A state bombed by two foreign powers, hosting a proxy war on its soil, and containing within its army other armies that do not obey it, cannot speak of sovereignty except as a linguistic relic from another era.

As long as Washington treats Iraq as an extension of its Iran file, and Tehran treats Iraq as an extension of its security perimeter, Baghdad will remain a spectator to its own fate, not a maker of it.

As long as Washington treats Iraq as an extension of its Iran file, and Tehran treats Iraq as an extension of its security perimeter, Baghdad will remain a spectator to its own fate, not a maker of it.

Western media captures this reality when it describes Iraq as a “suspended sovereignty,” but the truth is harsher: Iraq today is not a state without sovereignty—it is sovereignty without a state. A sovereignty raised in speeches and erased on the ground. A sovereignty used to justify paralysis, not reclaim authority. A sovereignty violated from the outside, hollowed out from the inside, and managed as if it were a bargaining chip rather than a national principle.

Unless the state is rebuilt from within—its institutions, its security decision‑making, its monopoly over legitimate force—Iraq will not be a party in the conflict between Washington and Tehran, but its stage. It will not be a player in the regional equation, but the vacuum through which others test their strength.

Only then do we understand that Iraq’s sovereignty dilemma is not a passing crisis but a chronic condition—and that the first step toward recovery is recognizing that sovereignty is not a slogan to be raised, but a capacity to be exercised. Without that capacity, Iraq will remain a country managed from the outside, drained from the inside, and forever stuck between two powers that do not fight over it… but fight above it.

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