When the waters of September 2014 engulfed Srinagar, entire neighbourhoods disappeared under muddy currents, hospitals became inaccessible, bridges collapsed, communication systems failed and the Valley witnessed one of the gravest urban disasters in its modern history. 

The floods were not merely a natural calamity. It exposed decades of ecological neglect, unplanned urbanisation, institutional fragmentation and weak environmental governance across Jammu and Kashmir.

More than a decade later, the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) report on the World Bank-assisted Jhelum and Tawi Flood Recovery Project raises uncomfortable but necessary questions. The audit does not simply document procedural delays or financial inefficiencies. It reveals something deeper and more troubling. It points to the  Jammu and Kash

ir’s recovery architecture which is fragmented, compartmentalised and unable to evolve into a coherent climate-resilient governance framework.  For me, the floods were not merely an administrative or environmental event to be studied from institutional files. They were deeply personal. At that time, I was residing in Jawahar Nagar, one of the worst-affected areas of Srinagar. I still remember the growing anxiety of the early morning of 7 September 2014 when I noticed floodwaters rapidly approaching near Dr. Sethi’s clinic at Jawahar Nagar Chowk. Sensing the gravity of the situation, my family vacated the house in time. That decision probably saved lives, but we lost household belongings, personal records, memories and the emotional security attached to a home built over decades.

Yet what remained with me most profoundly was the realisation that this disaster was not entirely natural. The floodwaters exposed years of ecological neglect, shrinking wetlands, unplanned urban expansion, weak drainage systems and fragmented governance structures that had steadily increased Kashmir’s vulnerability. The experience transformed my understanding of disaster management from a purely technical subject into a deeply human and ecological concern.

The tragedy of the floods was immense. The tragedy of the recovery lies in the fact that many structural lessons still remain insufficiently addressed. The JTFRP was conceived as an ambitious recovery and resilience-building initiative with World Bank assistance running into nearly Rs 1,500 crore. The project aimed to reconstruct damaged infrastructure, restore hospitals and schools, improve roads and bridges, strengthen disaster management systems, rehabilitate drainage infrastructure  and create long-term institutional preparedness for future climate-related disasters.On paper, the vision was progressive and timely. 

In implementation, however, the project became a case study in administrative fragmentation.

One of the clearest observations emerging from the CAG findings is the absence of unified institutional coordination. Multiple departments and agencies were involved in implementation including Public Works, urban local bodies, flood control authorities, health agencies, planning institutions and engineering wings. Instead of operating under a tightly integrated command structure, departments often functioned in silos with overlapping responsibilities and weak coordination mechanisms. The consequences were........

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