In June 2017, Indian and Chinese troops stared each other down on the windswept Doklam plateau in Bhutan, beginning a standoff that lasted for 73 days. The trigger was a Chinese road construction project that came perilously close to India’s vulnerable Siliguri Corridor—sandwiched between Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nepal—and brought home a chilling reality: The fate of India’s northeast could hinge on this sliver of land and the goodwill of its neighbors.

That vulnerability is now back in the conversation, not because of Chinese action, but because of a dramatic shift in Bangladesh’s foreign policy. In just a few months, India-Bangladesh ties have unraveled into mutual suspicion, strategic maneuvering, and a dangerous blame game. Since Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s ouster last August, New Delhi has lost its privileged access in Dhaka, where the new leadership is openly courting Beijing and Islamabad.

In June 2017, Indian and Chinese troops stared each other down on the windswept Doklam plateau in Bhutan, beginning a standoff that lasted for 73 days. The trigger was a Chinese road construction project that came perilously close to India’s vulnerable Siliguri Corridor—sandwiched between Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nepal—and brought home a chilling reality: The fate of India’s northeast could hinge on this sliver of land and the goodwill of its neighbors.

That vulnerability is now back in the conversation, not because of Chinese action, but because of a dramatic shift in Bangladesh’s foreign policy. In just a few months, India-Bangladesh ties have unraveled into mutual suspicion, strategic maneuvering, and a dangerous blame game. Since Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s ouster last August, New Delhi has lost its privileged access in Dhaka, where the new leadership is openly courting Beijing and Islamabad.

As India struggles to shape the global narrative after its recent clash with Pakistan, having its eastern neighbor aligned with its two biggest adversaries—to the west and the north—is not welcome news.

India’s troubles with Bangladesh are not the result of a hostile axis between China and Pakistan, but because of its own missteps: most notably, New Delhi’s unwavering support for Hasina’s authoritarian regime and the rise of Hindu nationalism under Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. By prioritizing short-term security interests and domestic politics over democratic values and goodwill, India alienated the Bangladeshi public, squandered its influence in Dhaka, and pushed its neighbor to seek out new partners.

Meanwhile, Indian media is awash with alarmist rhetoric that frames Bangladesh’s pivot as a conspiracy orchestrated by China and Pakistan. The truth is that India’s predicament is largely self-inflicted, the result of years of strategic myopia. The diplomatic rupture threatens India’s security, economic interests, and regional standing—underscoring the urgent need for introspection and a reset in New Delhi’s approach to its neighborhood.

Few places illustrate India’s strategic vulnerability more starkly than the Siliguri Corridor, which is 22 kilometers wide at its narrowest point and connects India’s northeast to the rest of the country. The corridor is a lifeline to the Indian states bordering China and Myanmar.

Muhammad Yunus, Bangladesh’s interim leader, did not mince words about the area during a visit to China in March, drawing outcry in New Delhi. He urged China to establish an economic foothold in Bangladesh by highlighting his country’s strategic position. “India’s northeast is completely landlocked, and its access to the ocean is completely controlled by Bangladesh. The Siliguri Corridor is the only route that connects the northeast with the rest of India, and this connection passes through Bangladesh,” Yunus said.

In China, Yunus showed a new willingness to leverage geography for diplomatic and economic advantage. This wasn’t just rhetoric: Chinese President Xi Jinping sent a plane to bring Yunus to Beijing, signaling close ties. China also granted 100 percent duty-free access to Bangladeshi exports and pledged to import more goods from Bangladesh. Yunus secured a commitment of $2.1 billion in Chinese funding, along with infrastructure and military cooperation agreements.

Eager to expand its influence in South Asia, China has long embraced Bangladesh as a partner, including during Hasina’s regime, when it built a submarine base in the coastal city of Pekua. These ties are reaching another level under Yunus, while India struggles to find its........

© Foreign Policy