For decades, U.S. policy toward North Korea has hinged on the hope that engagement and negotiation—particularly the promise of sanctions relief and security assurances—might temper Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions. Some now speculate that a second Trump presidency could revive this diplomatic dynamic. Yet such expectations miss a profound shift in North Korea’s strategic calculus.

No longer seeking mere transactional benefits from Washington, Pyongyang is asserting itself as a nuclear and military power and actively aligning with Russia and China. Its goal: to help forge a multipolar world order capable of diluting U.S. hegemony. Recognizing this new alignment is essential if the United States hopes to chart a realistic path forward on the Korean Peninsula.

For decades, U.S. policy toward North Korea has hinged on the hope that engagement and negotiation—particularly the promise of sanctions relief and security assurances—might temper Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions. Some now speculate that a second Trump presidency could revive this diplomatic dynamic. Yet such expectations miss a profound shift in North Korea’s strategic calculus.

No longer seeking mere transactional benefits from Washington, Pyongyang is asserting itself as a nuclear and military power and actively aligning with Russia and China. Its goal: to help forge a multipolar world order capable of diluting U.S. hegemony. Recognizing this new alignment is essential if the United States hopes to chart a realistic path forward on the Korean Peninsula.

Throughout the Cold War and its aftermath, North Korea relied on balancing diplomacy to secure regime survival amid great-power rivalry. During the 1960s and 1970s, Pyongyang skillfully exploited the Sino-Soviet split—extracting aid from both Beijing and Moscow while asserting its autonomy through the Juche ideology. This strategy of calibrated ambiguity enabled North Korea to avoid external domination and extract critical support from competing patrons.

The 1990s ushered in a new set of challenges. The collapse of the Soviet Union, along with the lingering effects of political upheaval in China following the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, compelled North Korea to broaden its engagement with the United States and pursue normalization with Japan and South Korea. The 1994 Agreed Framework epitomized Pyongyang’s effort to leverage diplomacy as a buffer against isolation and economic collapse.

In the early 2000s, the six-party talks—bringing together North Korea, South Korea, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia—embodied Pyongyang’s ongoing strategy of balancing among competing powers while advancing its own strategic interests. By drawing all regional stakeholders into multilateral negotiations, North Korea skillfully exploited their divergent priorities to buy time, secure concessions, and preserve its diplomatic relevance.

Even during the first Trump presidency, Kim Jong Un revived a strategy of equidistant diplomacy. Between 2018 and 2019, he met with Donald Trump

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