The war in Iran has unsettled the Gulf. Arab states are increasingly frustrated with the United States, which, after launching a war that wreaked havoc on global energy markets, failed to keep them safe from Iranian strikes. But the war is also forcing these countries to reassess their relationship with China. Beijing’s wait-and-see approach to the war and unwillingness to use its leverage over Tehran to contain the conflict have disabused Gulf Arab states of any lingering expectation that China could become an important security partner in the foreseeable future.

In the past few years, Gulf Arab states had come to see Beijing as a constructive force in the region. In 2023, about 36 percent of China’s total crude oil imports came from Gulf Cooperation Council countries (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain); and in 2024, Gulf trade with China reached nearly $300 billion, exceeding trade with the European Union and the United States combined. Many governments in the region anticipated that as Beijing’s economic engagement deepened, it would become more willing to restrain Iranian aggression to protect its local interests and stabilize the region.

Gulf Arab states are now realizing that China is even less likely than before the Iran war to take on responsibility for keeping the Gulf safe. Beijing lacks a vision for what the regional security order should be, and the chaos of the war has reinforced for China that its long-standing strategy of avoiding security commitments or taking sides is the best approach. Although China will continue to build commercial and investment ties in the region, Gulf Arab countries are being forced to accept that Beijing will not counterbalance Washington in ensuring regional security. They must now choose between more fully embracing a volatile United States and searching for new partners to replace what they had hoped China could become.

As China’s presence expanded in the Gulf since the beginning of this decade, expectations were high for what it could do for the region. Although many Gulf Arab states continued to look to Washington as their primary security guarantor, they were optimistic that Beijing was also going to contribute to their protection.

China was becoming increasingly reliant on the Gulf for energy and capital, which Gulf Arab states hoped would make Beijing more invested in safeguarding the region. Prior to the outbreak of the Iran war, in February, Gulf Cooperation Council countries exported nearly four million barrels of crude oil to China each day. Regional sovereign wealth funds were investing heavily in China and opening offices in Beijing, Hong Kong, and Shanghai; and numerous Gulf countries signed cooperation agreements with China in sectors including renewable energy and space technology. The Chinese diaspora in the Arabian Peninsula was also growing, reaching more than half a million.

Beijing’s influence in Tehran provided hope that China could temper Iran’s belligerence toward its neighbors. Iran is heavily reliant on China for economic and diplomatic support because of Washington’s long-standing sanctions. In 2021, the two countries signed a 25-year comprehensive cooperation agreement, which........

© Foreign Affairs