Ceasefire Without Political Settlement: The temporary US-Iran agreement halted direct fighting but left core disputes unresolved—especially control and leverage over the Strait of Hormuz, sanctions relief, and frozen assets—allowing both sides to treat it as a pause rather than the start of a genuine settlement.

Escalation Trap Dynamics: Drawing on Robert Pape’s concept, the article argues that military successes (US strikes on infrastructure and commanders) failed to force political concessions from Iran; each side therefore interprets coercive failure as a reason to intensify pressure rather than moderate demands, perpetuating the cycle.

Diplomacy Subordinated to Coercion: Domestic political constraints, mutual distrust, and the absence of strong verification or sequencing mechanisms mean negotiations continue in parallel with military and economic pressure, reducing the ceasefire to a temporary interruption rather than an exit from the conflict.

When the United States and Iran agreed to a ceasefire after weeks of military confrontation, many viewed it as a rare opportunity to prevent the conflict from spiralling into a wider regional war. The agreement temporarily halted direct military exchanges and raised hopes that diplomacy might succeed where coercion had failed. Yet within days, the ceasefire began to unravel. Renewed attacks on commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz prompted fresh U.S. strikes on Iranian military infrastructure, while Iran expanded its retaliation against U.S. military facilities in the Gulf. Since then, both sides have continued military exchanges while negotiations struggle to regain momentum. What initially appeared to be a diplomatic breakthrough quickly became another stage in the conflict’s escalation.

Much of the debate has focused on which side violated the ceasefire first. Yet the more important question is why the agreement failed so quickly. Its failure reflects a deeper strategic problem rather than a single triggering incident. The ceasefire suspended military operations but left the political incentives for escalation intact. Both Washington and Tehran continue to believe that additional coercion will produce the concessions earlier rounds of pressure failed to secure. The ceasefire interrupted the fighting without altering the strategic logic that sustains the conflict.

Robert Pape’s concept of the escalation trap provides a useful framework for understanding this dynamic. In essence, the escalation trap emerges when unsuccessful coercion encourages belligerents to intensify military pressure instead of reconsidering the political assumptions behind their strategy. Each failure becomes an argument for more force rather than a reason to negotiate. The U.S.-Iran ceasefire illustrates this dynamic with unusual clarity. Rather than breaking the cycle of coercion, the agreement merely paused it, leaving both sides convinced that........

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