In the spring of 1812, British textile workers smashed power looms across Nottinghamshire, convinced that the machines would make their skills worthless and their families destitute. They were right about the disruption. Mills did displace hand-weavers. Communities that had organized themselves around a particular kind of skilled labor were genuinely torn apart. The Luddites weren’t stupid, and they weren’t wrong to feel the ground shifting. They were wrong about one thing: the conclusion. The labor those machines displaced didn’t vanish. It migrated into factories, railways, cities, and industries that hadn’t existed, filling wants that hand-weavers in 1812 couldn’t have imagined needing to satisfy.

We are the Luddites now. Not the smashing machines part—the being right about the disruption and wrong about the conclusion part. Artificial Superintelligence will displace work on a scale that makes the power loom look modest. The disruption is real. The conclusion being drawn from it—permanent mass unemployment, the end of human economic relevance—is the same mistake, wearing better clothes.

What Production Actually Does

In 1803, Jean-Baptiste Say made an observation so simple that economists have spent two centuries finding ways to misread it: production is the source of purchasing power. When you produce something valuable, you generate income that creates demand for other goods. Supply and demand are not independent dials that can permanently fall out of alignment across a whole economy. New productive capacity doesn’t destroy demand—it transforms it, creates it, routes it toward things that didn’t previously exist.

This is why agriculture’s collapse from 40 percent of the American workforce in 1900 to less than 2 per cent today did not produce permanent unemployment for 38 percent of the population. Those workers became nurses, programmers, pilots, therapists, baristas, and UX designers—roles that barely existed or didn’t exist at all when their great grandparents were ploughing fields. The productivity gains from mechanization generated income and time to desire new goods, and markets routed labor toward satisfying those desires.

The ATM sharpens the point. When cash machines arrived, the consensus was that bank teller employment would collapse—why pay a human to do what a machine does more cheaply around the clock? What actually happened: lower operating costs per branch made it economical to open far more branches, and teller employment rose for........

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