Despite presenting itself as a neutral broker that hosted the 2023 Jeddah talks and repeatedly calls for a “Sudanese-led” ceasefire, Saudi Arabia is alleged to have provided the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) with substantial material support, including howitzers and procurement routes through Jeddah.

That support indirectly strengthens Islamist militias such as the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade, which the U.S. has designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization and which reportedly maintains ties to Iran’s IRGC—contradicting Riyadh’s public posture as a bulwark against Iranian-aligned political Islam.

The deeper driver appears to be a broader Red Sea strategic contest: securing influence over a corridor carrying 12–15% of global trade outweighs ideological consistency, making Sudan a battleground rather than simply a mediation file.

In May 2023, Saudi Arabia and the United States forced the Sudanese army and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) into a room in Jeddah. The two sides signed a declaration promising to protect civilians and open up aid routes. After a few days, they were back to fighting. Whenever the topic arises, Riyadh still refers to the agreement. When strikes hit Port Sudan and Kassala last May, the Saudi foreign ministry’s response ran through the same three beats it always does: condemn the attack, call for a ceasefire, insist on a “Sudanese-led” solution.

That posture — broker, not belligerent — has done a lot to bolster........

© Eurasia Review