History has repeatedly shown that, despite the military strength and advanced technology of repressive forces, they are ultimately unable to eradicate a movement that is organized, deeply rooted in society, and grounded in the ideal of freedom.

Since 2016, a new phenomenon has emerged in the Iranian people’s struggle against authoritarianism: the “Resistance Units.” This network was established by the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, the main opposition force.

Over nearly a decade, these units have reached a significant level of organization. At the same time, Iranian authorities have sought, by all means, to prevent the international community from fully recognizing the existence and expansion of this network across the country.

A striking example of their activities is the operation of February 23, 2026, carried out shortly before the outbreak of the war. During this operation, approximately 250 individuals linked to the Resistance Units targeted a highly secured complex associated with Ali Khamenei. According to available information, around 100 individuals were killed or arrested, while 150 others managed to withdraw. Government forces reportedly sustained significant losses. In addition, the identities of 82 individuals who were killed or arrested (aged 18 to 69) were reportedly transmitted to the United Nations.

This operation, which took place only weeks after the January 2026 uprising and its violent repression, sent a clear message: there exists in Iran an organized force capable of carrying out coordinated actions and seriously challenging the ruling power.

According to several sources, this network is believed to have conducted more than 4,000 operations against repressive structures over the past year alone. It also played a notable role in organizing, directing, and expanding the January protests. During these events, approximately 2,000 members of these units reportedly went missing, and the fate of many of them remains unknown to this day.

Structurally, each Resistance Unit typically consists of three or more individuals, often drawn from the same neighborhood or city. This localized organization enhances internal security while facilitating the gradual expansion of the network. Their social composition is diverse, including students, workers, doctors, university professors, small business owners, and former political prisoners.

Members of these units operate with full awareness of the risks involved, including arrest, torture, or execution. To date, six individuals have been executed for their alleged participation in armed actions and for their affiliation with the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran.

One of the key roles of these units is to counter the climate of fear imposed by the regime. While the authorities rely on mass executions to intimidate the population, these networks seek to convey the opposite message: “We are stronger than executions and massacres.”

In this context, they have also contributed to structuring and unifying protest slogans, directing them explicitly against the regime. Among these slogans is “Neither Shah nor Mullah,” which rejects both the current regime and the monarchist alternative.

Continuing these activities, reports indicate that these units carried out 31 operations on March 3 and 20 operations on March 15, targeting, among others, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Basij militia, as well as other security structures.

Signs of concern are also emerging at the highest levels of the state. Mohammad Reza Aref warned that if opposition forces attempted to “liberate Iran,” the regime would respond as it did in 1988—namely, through force (Tasnim News Agency, March 17).

Finally, on April 8, 2026, Roozbeh Alamdari, an analyst close to the government, wrote on the platform X: “We must not be carried away by the narrative of victory. No trust should be placed in the enemy, and we must not ignore the risk of an ‘Eternal Light 2.'” He was referring to the Operation Eternal Light, conducted in 1988 by the People’s Mojahedin, then based along the Iran–Iraq border, which aimed to advance toward Tehran but ultimately failed.

© Eurasia Review