To a greater or lesser extent, Cyprus has been on-and-off a cat’s paw of the greed and ambitions of stronger powers for hundreds of years, but the island had never been divided both geographically and racially until Turkey invaded in 1974, cutting off the northern third of the island, expelling nearly all the Greek Cypriots and importing Turkish settlers who have almost swamped the original Turkish Cypriots[1]. The modern manifestation of the island’s strategic importance are Britain’s SBAs (Sovereign Base Areas), on which Cyprus’ qualified independence in 1960 was predicated. As the talks on re-uniting Cyprus grind on, as they have for over fifty years, it is time to consider the potential effect of the current fluidity and re-setting of inter-state relations. China, Ukraine and the Middle East are now in the cross-hairs of US policy. But when and if Syria and Palestine stabilise – at least to some extent – and when the tension vis-á-vis China lessens, Cyprus is likely to come under increasing scrutiny from its controllers. In this brief overview, we shall consider the current fluidity, bordering on disorder, of world affairs, to the extent that it affects Cyprus, the British bases, Greek-Russian relations, and Israel and Turkey, concluding by looking at Russia’s enhanced role and influence in the wake of her putative victory over NATO in the Ukraine fighting, and how she and the US might cut the Gordian knot.

Currently

Along with Trump’s new business-oriented approach to inter-state affairs, and his clear interest in the Middle East and supporting the Jewish State, including a somewhat bizarre plan to resettle the inhabitants of Gaza and create an American haven, we have the Russian factor, and the intense meetings going on between Russian and American diplomats to restore and normalise relations. Despite Trump’s support for Zionism, he may well become increasingly irritated by suggestions that American foreign policy is managed by the Jewish State, at least as regards the Middle East. In this connection, there have been indications that Americans, particularly younger ones, are increasingly outraged by the killing of Palestinian civilians. And given his interest in normalising relations with Russia, even to the extent of understanding and acting on the latter’s security concerns, it is possible that, despite Israeli objections, the Russian preference for a neutral Cyprus, free of foreign forces, could be discussed, sidelining the EU and UK, at least in the initial stages, as per the Washington-Moscow talks on Ukraine. The recent resumption of UN-sponsored intercommunal talks (March 2025) ended, as usual, in a polite stalemate. Let us now start to cut to the chase.

NATO and the Bases

It is sufficiently well known that the qualified independence that Cyprus achieved in 1960 was due largely to the efforts of the island’s first president, Archbishop Makarios, as well as to American pressure to achieve a ‘NATO solution’, in other words the de facto annexation of almost 3% of Cyprus to harbour the SBAs, which Makarios was obliged to accept. Perhaps somewhat surrealistically, over half the text of the treaty establishing the new state was devoted to the British bases and Britain’s peripheral rights in military movements and overflights. The very creation of the new state was predicated on NATO strategy. That says it all. The bases, part of British sovereign territory, remain in perpetuity, at least as long as the United Kingdom does, or until Russian and even American pressure forces them out.

The SBAs have proved to be an embarrassment to Britain: as early as 1964, the Foreign Office was admitting privately that the SBAs would be regarded as increasingly anachronistic by world public opinion; by 1975, according to the Foreign Office, British strategic interests in Cyprus were considered to be minimal, and Britain tried hard to relinquish its bases, but came up against Kissinger’s opposition. Even after the latter was no longer in charge of American foreign policy, his spectre remained, and by 1981, Britain had given up trying to relinquish the bases: in a bizarre about-turn, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office now even put retaining her bases as more important than the search for a solution, claiming privately that  an early solution might not help (since pressures against the SBAs might then build up), and that British interests were best served by continuing movement towards a solution – without the early prospect of arrival[2].Clearly, Britain no longer has a say in the matter, and is obliged to take its instructions from Washington. Similarly, the Greek government, for all its lip-service to a seriously sovereign and unified Cyprus, also has no serious say in the matter, being obliged to follow Washington’s policy, and not daring (even if it wanted to) to ask for Moscow’s support (as Makarios was able to do), in the knowledge that Washington, and therefore London, consider Turkey more important strategically than Greece[3]. Given the Ukraine war, up to now Greece has been forced into an even more hostile stance vis-á-vis Russia than previously, following Brussels........

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