Winston Churchill famously said, “those who do not learn history are condemned to repeat it.” The truth is, even when we do learn history, we often remain trapped in its repetition. Worse still, attempts to act on historical lessons—such as after World War I—often end up creating new conditions for history to repeat itself. And when we choose passivity or forget history altogether, as seems to be the case today, history turns us into its next lesson. This captivity to historical cycles appears methodologically inescapable. Worse, it suggests a kind of universal curse: one that plays out at both the level of individual human nature, as Morgenthau explored, and at the level of interstate dynamics, as seen in Mearsheimer’s analysis. Power—and its corrupting influence—remains the defining feature of both human and international relations.

Power returns, war resurfaces, and crisis deepens—all of which we are collectively experiencing today. Analogously, whether we look at: 50–60 year Kondratieff cycles of economic growth and contraction; 80–100 year Power Transition Theory (Organski and Kugler); 80–120 year Modelski Long Cycle Theory of global power; 100–150 year Gilpinian hegemonic cycles; the World-Systems Theory of Wallerstein (center-periphery expansion); the 200–300 year secular Malthusian cycles of population and resource pressure; or even Toynbee’s 500–800-year civilizational cycles of east-west transitions – they all appear to converge in our current historical moment.

A better framework for studying these recurring cycles in international relations may be found in the evolution of the discipline of International Relations (IR) itself: at the intersection of theory (knowledge, agents, discourses) and practice (interstate relations, wars, trade, power distribution, international system configuration). The frictions between theory and practice are not separate—they are co-constitutive. Reality shapes theory, and theory shapes reality. IR moves through recurring cycles aligned with the rise and decline of structural power. These cycles manifest in theory—through oscillations between realism/rationalism and liberalism/reflectivism—and in practice—through the alternation between periods of peace and moments of war. Their co-constitutive relation make that the state of intellectual realm is directly associated (or inversely related) to the state of the system’s power distribution (i.e., war/peace). The closer to war the more realist and the further from conflict the more idealist. The undulating patterns of theory and practice converge at critical inflection points, resulting in paroxysms: major wars or profound ideological transformations.

These moments of intersections mark thresholds—tipping points where both the global order and theoretical paradigms undergo systemic shifts in equilibrium. By modeling this co-evolution of theory and practice as an oscillating dynamic—between politics and policy, context and content—we may better anticipate the intellectual/physical conditions leading to the next rupture. Understanding these turbulent intersections as part of a continuous progression of theory and practice may give us the best chance to prevent conflicts and avoid flawed intellectual approaches.

Intersection 1: Post-First World War

The modern discipline of International Relations took shape in the 1920s, forged in direct response to the devastation of the First World War. The unprecedented destruction was seen not as an accident of history but as a failure of the existing order—rooted in militarism, nationalism, imperial rivalry, and the precarious balance of power. This context created the demand for a new kind of intellectual “content”: theories aimed at explaining, anticipating, and ultimately preventing violent interstate practice.

Liberal Institutionalism emerged as the first major response, propelled by idealist convictions that peace could be secured through law, norms, and cooperative governance. Its architects—figures such as Woodrow Wilson—sought to replace........

© E-International