Following the events of October 7, 2023 and the outbreak of the Gaza War, Israel made a conscious geopolitical reevaluation when it recognized Somaliland on December 26, 2025. Strategic diversification across several key locations in the Horn of Africa was required due to the growing Houthi attacks and the susceptibility of Israel’s sole military base in Eritrea to regional unrest. This decision embodies operational insights derived from reliance on single forward operating bases: While the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels have demonstrated an unparalleled ability to conduct asymmetric disruption operations through drone and missile attacks on commercial vessels, the Israeli strategic assessment has shifted toward reducing geographic dependence and establishing operational platforms capable of facilitating intelligence gathering, logistical coordination, and maritime surveillance independently of Eritrea’s unstable political alliances. As a result, Israeli intelligence intensified its covert contact with the political leadership in Somaliland throughout 2024, culminating in formal diplomatic recognition, a move openly acknowledged by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu as a direct result of years of clandestine intelligence cooperation designed to establish Israel’s alternative access to the Red Sea.

Somaliland gained recognition from over thirty-five states, including Israel, on June 26, 1960. However, it united with the former Italian Somali territory at the end of the same month. This early, short-lived independence marked the beginning of Somaliland’s longe and uneven journey to recognition. Since the unilateral declaration of independence in 1991, Hargeisa has sought to revive that lost legal status by promoting itself as both an island of relative pluralism and electoral competition in a turbulent region, as well as a key security partner against Al-Shabaab and other jihadist groups that continue to destabilize southern Somalia. This struggle for recognition is demonstrated by Ethiopia’s January 1, 2024, Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which exchanges future recognition for access to 20 km of Red Sea coastline near Berbera, and concurrent efforts in Washington to position Somaliland as a strategic asset in Red Sea security and great-power competition. The question today is no longer whether Somaliland has a case for recognition, but rather which capitals will go from de facto to de jure first. The question that arises here is what comes next, and what scenarios might reshape........

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