Ukrainian soldiers with a captured Russian T-90M Proryv tank in the Kursk region. Photo courtesy Ministry of Defence of Ukraine/Wikimedia Commons.

In December 1990, Serbian rebels declared independence in the Croatian region of Krajina. A year and a half of war followed, ending in a ceasefire in May 1992 that left Krajina under Serbian control. The Croats, however, refused to recognize the loss of the territory, rearmed, and in August 1995 attacked Krajina and rapidly reconquered it.

In a similar vein, in May 1994, a ceasefire brought an end to the First Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan, leaving the contested province of Nagorno-Karabakh and a large amount of surrounding Azeri territory under Armenian control. But the ceasefire did not resolve any of the underlying issues that caused the war. While Armenia enjoyed the spoils of its victory, Azerbaijan rebuilt its army and in September 2020 launched the Second Karabakh War, the result of which was a decisive Azeri victory and the restoration of Azeri control of its lost territories.

And in a more recent example, after the Syrian National Army had driven anti-Assad rebels into a small corner of Syria around the town of Idlib, a ceasefire was agreed that left the Idlib area under rebel control. In the years that followed, the rebels built up their forces with Turkish help while the Assad government sat back and did relatively little. This year the rebels struck, speedily crushed the Syrian National Army and drove Bashar al-Assad from power.

These examples demonstrate that ceasefires that fail to settle the political differences underlying a war often prove to be temporary. Often the side that came out worse in the original war takes the opportunity to revive its military and then, when the time is right, renews the war in an effort to retake what it has lost.

Knowledge of this possibility can persuade political leaders not to make peace even when it would make sense otherwise to do so. In studies of war termination, this is known as the “credible commitment problem”—warring parties will not make peace as they do not believe that the commitments others make in peace negotiations are credible. Overcoming this problem is one of the most important tasks of would-be peacemakers.

As the war in Ukraine reaches the end of its third year, the credible commitment problem provides a useful lens through which to determine the prospects of US President Donald Trump’s efforts to bring the conflict to an end. These efforts have now moved firmly beyond talk into the realm of action.........

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