Earlier this month, Gantumur Luvsannyam, Mongolia’s first deputy prime minister, said that negotiations over the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline were proceeding and making progress. This is a major gas pipeline connecting China and Russia, which, if completed, can deliver (through Mongolia) 50 billion cubic metres of Russian natural gas to China yearly – gas that Russia previously supplied to Europe.

There has long been speculation that the project had stalled amid geopolitical complications, and the actual status of this project remains clear despite Luvsannyam’s statement. In any case, this reminds one of the complex Russian-Mongolian relationship. For instance, amid the repercussions of this announcement, Mongolia’s former president Elbegdorj resurfaced on social media. It is worth delving into that.

One may recall that in September 2022, as Russia’s “partial mobilization” was announced, former Mongolian President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj made a striking appeal. Addressing the Kalmyks, Buryats, and Tuvins-ethnic minorities within Russia—he urged them to flee to Mongolia rather than serve as “cannon fodder” in what he described as Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine. This was a public call, amplified through social media and international outlets at the time, that raised eyebrows and sparked debate.

Was Elbegdorj genuinely offering sanctuary (and in what capacity) to kindred peoples, or was he interfering in Russia’s internal affairs, perhaps at the behest of Ukraine’s Western allies? The implications of his actions (echoing to this day) ripple far beyond Mongolia’s borders, touching on questions of sovereignty, ethnic tensions, and geopolitical maneuvering.

Elbegdorj’s statement came shortly after Putin’s September 21, 2022, mobilization order, which aimed to draft 300,000 reservists to bolster Russia’s campaign in Ukraine. Reports emerged claiming that ethnic minorities,........

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