From Russian orbit to US engagement: Syria’s pivot and its security consequences
Ahmad al-Sharaa’s pilgrimage to Washington and the concurrent, temporary easing of US sanctions mark a dramatic inflection point in Syria’s post-2011 trajectory. The meeting at the White House, given that it was itself historic, as no Syrian head of state had visited Washington previously, both symbolizes and accelerates Damascus’s rapid diplomatic rehabilitation. The US Treasury’s decision to suspend the imposition of certain Caesar Act measures for 180 days significantly reduces the economic and political costs of re-engagement, providing Moscow’s rivals with a brief window to shift the balance of influence within Syria.
To understand the strategic significance of that pivot, it helps to recall Syria’s recent history under Bashar al-Assad and the depth of Moscow–Damascus entanglement. Under Assad, Syria became a reliable client of Russia: Moscow supplied arms, provided decisive military intervention from 2015 onwards, and established permanent dual facilities, the naval logistics point at Tartus and the Khmeimim air base in Latakia, that guaranteed sustained Russian access to the eastern Mediterranean. That relationship was transactional and profound: Russia rescued a regime under existential threat, and in return extracted geopolitical leverage and a foothold for power projection.
Al-Sharaa’s ascent from insurgent commander to president after the fall of Assad represents an upheaval of that post-2015 order. Although his past as a rebel and militia leader complicates Western acceptance, his removal from the US terrorism blacklist and the lifting of UN sanctions have opened diplomatic space that simply did not exist under Assad. Those moves are not simply symbolic: sanctions relief facilitates investment, reconstruction contracts, and diplomatic normalisation, all levers that Washington can use to draw Syria into a different orbit.
If Washington genuinely welcomes and invests in al-Sharaa’s interim government, the immediate strategic consequence will be to erode Moscow’s monopoly of influence. Russia’s bases will remain a powerful bargaining chip. Moscow has in the past negotiated........





















Toi Staff
Gideon Levy
Tarik Cyril Amar
Sabine Sterk
Stefano Lusa
Mort Laitner
Mark Travers Ph.d
Ellen Ginsberg Simon
Gilles Touboul
John Nosta