As the world watches the fragile ceasefire in Gaza, the spotlight is turning to an unusual coalition of Muslim-majority nations — Indonesia, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan, as potential contributors to a U.S.-proposed international stabilization force.

While the concept remains in its early stages, the idea signals a new approach to peacekeeping in the Middle East: one where regional actors, rather than Western troops, could play a central role in maintaining order, supporting local police forces, and paving the way for Gaza’s reconstruction. The move also highlights Washington’s reliance on politically and culturally diverse partners to lend legitimacy to its controversial 20-point plan for Gaza.

Muhammad Asif Noor, a political analyst and Director of the Center for Central Asia and Eurasian Studies at the Institute of Peace and Diplomatic Studies, spoke to Azernews about the emerging international stabilization force for Gaza. He noted that the involvement of countries like Pakistan, Azerbaijan, and Indonesia could bring a combination of peacekeeping experience, regional legitimacy, and cultural understanding to the mission:

- Could this force actually operate effectively in Gaza’s complex urban terrain?

- Operating effectively in Gaza’s terrain would be one of the greatest tests any multinational stabilization force has ever faced. Gaza is not merely an urban zone—it is a compressed battlespace where geography, demography, and trauma intersect. The Strip’s dense high-rises, narrow alleyways, and sprawling 500-kilometer tunnel network make it an environment that consumes conventional military logic. As of mid-2025, nearly three-quarters of Gaza’s land has been marked by demolitions and buffer zones, creating vast no-go areas where both insurgents and civilians coexist in fragile proximity. Visibility is limited, and each street corner holds the potential for an ambush. In such conditions, armored mobility loses its advantage, and technology alone cannot distinguish between a militant and a man fleeing rubble with his family. To be effective, a stabilization mission would require more than superior firepower; it would demand cultural fluency, intelligence coordination, and moral legitimacy. Gaza’s population is not merely war-weary but deeply skeptical of external actors. Western-led interventions have often been viewed as extensions of occupation, eroding trust even before the first patrol begins.

By contrast, Muslim-majority countries like Indonesia, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan possess an inherent advantage and that is shared faith and cultural affinity. This can translate into local acceptance, critical for intelligence gathering, humanitarian coordination, and conflict de-escalation. When troops are seen not as occupiers but as protectors, local cooperation can replace resistance, enabling smoother operations even in the Strip’s most volatile quarters.

However, effectiveness will also depend on how clearly the mission’s mandate is defined. Without robust rules of engagement, an agreed command structure, and credible international oversight, whether through the UN, OIC, or a hybrid coalition, the force risks being trapped between insurgency and accusation. Coordination with Israel and Palestinian authorities will be necessary but politically sensitive; one misstep could turn a peacekeeping effort into a geopolitical flashpoint. Moreover, Gaza’s tunnels, improvised explosives, and sniper positions mean that traditional static deployments are untenable. Instead, mobile units trained in counter-insurgency, equipped with drone reconnaissance, and supported by humanitarian corridors will be essential to prevent escalation while ensuring aid flows to civilians.

A stabilization force can succeed in Gaza, but only if it operates as more than a military presence. Its strength must lie in restraint, legitimacy, and partnership with local communities. The terrain will test discipline, but it will also reward empathy. If the participating nations can fuse tactical professionalism with cultural understanding, they........

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