Although recent signs suggest a mild easing of tensions between Baku and Moscow, bilateral relations remain fragile. These frictions inevitably bring into question the future of major joint economic and logistical projects, especially the strategic North-South Transport Corridor and a critical Russian gas delivery plan to Iran via Azerbaijani territory. Both initiatives hinge directly on Azerbaijan’s stance, making Baku an indispensable player in shaping the region’s energy and transport future.

At the same time, the Russian media has intensified coverage of the possible economic fallout of a complete breakdown in bilateral ties. A recurring narrative suggests Azerbaijan’s greater vulnerability, emphasising its export dependence on Russia and quoting select trade statistics to back the claim.

According to 2024 trade data, Azerbaijan’s top non-energy exports included plastics and plastic products ($368.9 million), gold ($211.9 million), cotton ($177.1 million), exotic fruits ($175.5 million), tomatoes ($175.4 million), passenger cars ($171.7 million), nuts ($131.3 million), fertilizers ($126.2 million), aluminum sheets ($110.1 million), and stone fruits ($99.4 million). Russia is the main importer for at least half of these categories. Specifically, Russia accounted for:

98% of Azerbaijan’s stone fruit exports ($97.1 million)

96% of tomato exports ($168.7 million)

87% of exotic fruits ($153.4 million)

64% of plastic products ($235.7 million)

53% of nuts ($70.2 million)

From the import side, Russian experts argue that Azerbaijan’s domestic oil market is supported by imports of Russian Ural oil (1.53 million tons in 2024), which Azerbaijan purchases for domestic use while exporting its premium Azeri Light crude. According to UN Comtrade data, nearly $1.18 billion of Russian exports to Azerbaijan in 2024 were in the energy category, making up one-third of total exports.

In the first four months of 2025, the structure of........

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