The historian of naval warfare is to be envied by his land counterpart. The Duke of Wellington wrote to a confidant after Waterloo:

The history of a [land] battle is not unlike the history of a ball. Some individuals may recollect all the little events of which the great result is the battle won or lost, but no individual can recollect the order in which, or the exact moment at which, they occurred, which makes all the difference as to their value or importance.

The history of a [land] battle is not unlike the history of a ball. Some individuals may recollect all the little events of which the great result is the battle won or lost, but no individual can recollect the order in which, or the exact moment at which, they occurred, which makes all the difference as to their value or importance.

The fear of invasion by Bonaparte had been real enough, and widespread

The fear of invasion by Bonaparte had been real enough, and widespread

The naval historian, however, has the advantage of the meticulous recording of orders and manoeuvres in the ship’s log and the logs of the signal midshipmen and flag lieutenants, and, in the case of Trafalgar (21 October 1805), the notes of Nelson’s conference with his captains before the battle. Thus, while arguments continue about whether the culminating point at Waterloo was the guards’ volley against Napoleon’s middle and old guard as they broached the ridge of Mont St Jean, or the 52nd light infantry’s fleet-footed manoeuvring to volley in enfilade (an issue that still fills pages), let alone the arrival of the Prussians, there is no really comparable controversy over Trafalgar.

What, then, is there new to say about the battle that was fought to prevent the French from taking control of the English Channel long enough to ship across their wishfully named Armée d’Angleterre? The extensive bibliography in Paul O’Keeffe’s Trafalgar alone would suggest a........

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