Latin Americans Already Have a Serious Partner — and It’s Not Trump

Dr. Stuenkel, a German Brazilian political scientist, has written extensively about Latin America, geopolitics and international relations.

On Saturday, President Trump met with leaders from across Latin America and the Caribbean for the so-called Shield of the Americas Summit in Florida. The meeting, which largely centered on the fight against organized crime, was another high-profile attempt by the Trump administration to claim geopolitical primacy in the Western Hemisphere — a goal that made the top of last year’s National Security Strategy and has been referred to as the Donroe Doctrine.

But the event did little more than reveal the limits of Mr. Trump’s regional strategy. The meeting had a deep bench of Mr. Trump’s Latin American allies, like Argentina’s Javier Milei and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele. But the leaders of Brazil, Mexico and Colombia — which together account for more than half of the region’s G.D.P. — were conspicuously absent.

Mr. Trump’s approach has leaned heavily on economic coercion, flattery of ideological kin and the specter of military intervention to force regional alignment. The U.S. president apparently seeks a clean network of allies purged of perceived foreign influence or anti-Trumpian defiance. This strategy has in many ways fallen short. It is difficult to project an image of an engaged hegemon when the administration’s focus is being pulled into a Middle Eastern quagmire and even more difficult when the president’s approach relies on threats and rebukes rather than a positive agenda for the region.

For years, Washington’s Latin America policy has oscillated between neglect and alarmism — about security threats, migration flows, anti-American regimes and Chinese influence. The result is a region that has learned to nod to U.S. concerns while quietly cashing Chinese checks.

Beijing’s strategy has been one of patient, deep-pocketed presence: Since 2005, Chinese banks have provided upwards of $120 billion in loan commitments to Latin American and Caribbean nations, often targeting the energy, mining and heavy transport sectors where Western capital has grown risk-averse. This means that even supposedly pro-American leaders practice a kind of strategic hedging. They welcome constructive ties to the United States, which remains the region’s most important source of foreign direct investment — but they are unwilling to let Mr. Trump dictate the terms of their engagement with China.

That is in no small part because Mr. Trump’s approach is light on positive incentives. American officials frequently warn of the risks posed by engagement with Beijing, citing so-called debt-trap diplomacy and potential dual-use military applications for Chinese-built infrastructure. But Washington has struggled to present a compelling economic alternative or explain how Latin American countries would benefit from distancing themselves from China.

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