Asia Defense | Security | East Asia | Oceania

NATO-IP4 Relations Remain Stronger Than the Last Two Summits Suggest

Yes, the Indo-Pacific leaders were absent for the second year in a row. But that’s not because of a lack of interest in the partnership.

The chiefs of defense of the United States, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea attend a session on “Partners in the Indo-Pacific” at the 194th NATO Military Committee in Chiefs of Defense session in Brussels, Belgium, Jan. 22, 2026.

A notable feature of the July 2026 NATO Summit in Ankara was the absence, for the second year in a row, of the four leaders of NATO’s Indo-Pacific partner countries, collectively known as the IP4: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. It may be tempting to see this as evidence that NATO-IP4 relations are on the downturn, but a deeper analysis does not support such a conclusion. 

First, the main variable affecting the presence of the IP4 leaders was not the interest of NATO and IP4 countries in continued engagement, but the nature of the summits themselves. In addition, it is not clear that regular leader-level attendance at annual NATO summits is still a necessary driver of NATO-IP4 relations. The logic for continued cooperation between NATO and the IP4 is as strong as ever in the current geopolitical climate. 

Rather than the optics of NATO-IP4 relations, the underlying substance and direction of engagement, the subleader level institutionalization of these relationships, and their application at the practical level are the critical elements for gauging commitment. 

Summits Fit for Purpose

The key difference between the summits in 2022, 2023, and 2024 and the summits in 2025 and 2026 is in their structure. All three of those earlier summits involved two days of North Atlantic Council (NAC) meetings at leader level. The latter two summits had only one. Getting that attenuated timeline required cutting out the NAC leaders’ meetings with partner countries. 

That change in structure primarily reflects the realities of the United States. To paraphrase the words of an allied official, NATO understands that President Donald Trump does not have the interest or attention span for a two-day summit, so the summits had to be shortened – simply as a matter of practicality and realistic expectations. 

It is true that the IP4 leaders were still invited, and that most did not attend – that fact is indisputable. This decision becomes much more understandable when examined in context, however. Without an opportunity to take part in NAC discussions, the IP4 leaders were effectively invited to the rehearsal dinner, but not to the wedding itself. From the potential perspectives of busy heads of state, such an invitation simply does not carry the weight necessary to edge out competing domestic and regional priorities. It’s a nice opportunity, but – in combination with the simultaneous attendance of their defense ministers at complementary summit events for those peers – not a compelling one. 

It would be a mistake, however, to equate summit representation with the current health of the partner-alliance relationships. Leader attendance at the 2022, 2023, and 2024 summits, which each featured a NAC leader-level session with IP4 partners, was critical to moving NATO-IP4 relations forward, establishing their importance publicly, and creating the momentum from the top necessary to activate national bureaucracies. Those goals have now been met substantially, making continued leader-level attendance less vital. 

By 2024, all four of the partner countries had signed new Individually Tailored Partnership Program (ITPP) documents to map out their bilateral NATO relationships. They all had dedicated ambassadors to NATO at embassies in Belgium, and were engaged in specific NATO-IP4 priority areas of cooperation: Ukraine, cyber defense, disinformation, and technology.  

Certainly, leader-level attention is the best driver for continued internal momentum within each country and for the further deepening of these relationships. That said, top leaders’ absence from regular summit-based intervals could be offset, to a significant extent, by the greater involvement of defense and foreign ministers and the continued visits of high-level NATO officials to the region. There is a clear effort being made at NATO to create such opportunities and by IP4 partners to respond. 

The IP4 ministers of defense (minister of defense industry for Australia) attended the Ankara summit and met with their NATO counterparts at a NAC defense minister-level working dinner and a NATO defense industry forum, expanding on defense and foreign ministerial engagements from recent years. In 2025, new NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte traveled to Tokyo to meet with Japan’s prime minister and other high-level NATO officials visited the region, continuing a trend from the past few years. Perhaps most importantly, the NATO-IP4 relationships – bilaterally and as the IP4 – are already institutionalized at the ambassador and working levels in Brussels.

Geopolitical Drivers for Continued Engagement

There are at least four clear geopolitical drivers for continued........

© The Diplomat