Asia Defense | Security | East Asia

The Iran-Israel-US War Is Exposing China’s Alliance Problem

The conflict in the Middle East accentuates a structural weakness in China’s global strategy: the absence of capable allies that can act as a force multiplier.

The multinational attendees in the Freedom Shield 2026 military exercises, led by South Korea and the United States, participate in an orientation session at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys, South Korea, Mar. 3, 2026.

During a press briefing on the war involving the United States, Israel, and Iran, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth declared, “Fighting shoulder to shoulder with such a capable ally is a true force multiplier and a breath of fresh air.” The remark was directed squarely at Israel for its “unmatched skill and iron determination.”

U.S. partners in the Gulf – United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia – which had stood resilient and performed remarkably well against Iranian retaliatory missile and drone attacks, have received far less attention and praise. While Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acknowledged that various partners and allies in the Gulf are defending alongside the United States, the full strategic aspect of the partners’ contribution appears to be overlooked. 

Granted, these states are defending their sovereignty against Iranian retaliatory attacks. Moreover, fearing entrapping themselves further in the conflict, the Gulf states avoided direct participation in offensive operations. However, their contribution toward the ongoing U.S. military operations cannot be discounted. From providing critical information from early warning systems to facilitating the interception of Iranian missiles and drones, to having permitted the U.S. to house bases and sustain a forward presence for operations, to finally providing the necessary geographic strategic depth, Gulf partners have indirectly helped enable and sustain U.S. military operations against Iran.

Be it an offensive-oriented participation of the war, as demonstrated by the Israelis, or an indirect and restrained type of participation by the Gulf states, both dimensions are testament that U.S. power is tremendously aggregated by its vast alliance network. Indeed, an alliance can render both offensive and defensive assistance, and in both cases would function as a great force multiplier. 

This lesson on alliance and its force multiplier effect is unlikely to be lost on military strategists in China. From Beijing’s view, the ongoing conflict in the Middle East accentuates a structural weakness in China’s strategic calculation: the absence of capable allies that can act as a force multiplier. 

Unlike the United States, which enjoys an extensive global network of allies and security partners, China has only one formal ally: North Korea, via the 1961 Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. Although China boasts strategic partnerships with countries such as Pakistan, Russia, and Iran, these partnerships remain far looser than a traditional alliance, and have proven to be less effective than an alliance in times of contingencies. Indeed, despite being in a strategic partnership with Iran, China has so far remained restrained in its action, only verbally condemning the U.S. for the killing of Iranian Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Beijing’s lack of effort on the part of its strategic partner has even resulted in it being criticized by some as a “fair weather friend.” 

On the other hand, China remains cautious of formal alliances, for historical experiences informed by the Sino-Soviet split that reminds Chinese leaders of strategic constraints imposed by formal alliances. Consequently, China has often reiterated its preference for flexible partnerships. Beijing views the alliance systems of the United States as a relic of the Cold War that contributes to global instability. 

Yet, the proper functioning of U.S. alliance in the ongoing Iran-Israel-U.S. War would surely........

© The Diplomat