Trans-Pacific View | Diplomacy | Southeast Asia

Is Cambodia Pivoting to the US by Joining President Trump’s Board of Peace?

A binary U.S.-China framing obscures the layered and multi-directional character of Cambodia’s current foreign policy.

U.S. President Donald Trump speaks during the during the founding ceremony of his Board of Peace in Davos, Switzerland, Jan. 22, 2026.

On February 19, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet traveled to Washington to attend the first meeting of U.S. President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace (BoP). Cambodia’s decision to participate in the initiative as a founding member has once again prompted speculation that Phnom Penh may be edging closer toward Washington. For a country often described as China’s most reliable partner in Southeast Asia, even limited engagement with a U.S.-associated platform is quickly interpreted as strategic realignment.

Much like Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s bid to join the BRICS grouping were misread as a tilt away from the West, Cambodia’s engagement with the BoP risks being squeezed into a binary “China versus United States” frame. The underlying assumption is that more engagement with Washington must mean less with Beijing.

This interpretation is overly reductive. It assumes that Cambodia’s foreign policy operates along a single axis and that participation in one initiative necessarily dilutes commitment to another. Such a framing obscures the layered and multi-directional character of Cambodia’s current external engagement.

A more grounded explanation begins by clarifying what the BoP is not. It is not a military alliance. It does not entail defense obligations, exclusive political commitments, or binding security arrangements. Its character is diplomatic and consultative rather than strategic in the hard-security sense. Treating Cambodia’s involvement as a pivot exaggerates the geopolitical weight of the platform itself.

The more analytically useful question is why Phnom Penh sees value in joining.

Three interconnected factors help explain the move: geostrategic positioning, geopolitical risk management, and domestic political considerations.

The first concerns geostrategic positioning. Cambodia’s prior endorsement of Chinese initiatives – from its early support for the Belt and Road Initiative and other Chinese global governance proposals, alongside its consistent adherence to the One-China Policy – does not lock it into a singular strategic orbit.

Cambodia has limited capacity to reshape an increasingly rivalry-driven regional order. In such conditions, maintaining a presence in multiple institutional arenas enhances flexibility, particularly when governance frameworks remain fluid. Participation in the BoP provides a structured diplomatic interface with Washington (and with President Trump) after a period in which bilateral ties have experienced periodic strains. It offers a politically manageable channel for rebuilding trust and expanding cooperation incrementally, without requiring strategic realignment.

At the same time, Cambodia’s economic and strategic ties with China are deeply embedded and unlikely to be reversed. Beijing remains a major source of investment, financing, and trade. In the textile and garment sector – the backbone of Cambodia’s export economy – production depends heavily on Chinese intermediate inputs and supply chains. The industry employs around 800,000 Cambodian workers, roughly 80 percent of whom are women. Their wages sustain households across the country. Chinese capital is also deeply involved in infrastructure development and construction, while tourism flows from China have long contributed significantly to national revenue.

Reversing course from China would therefore come with an economic cost. It would risk destabilizing export capacity, employment, and investor confidence. That structural reality makes the narrative of a geopolitical “switch” implausible. During an interview with Reuters while in Washington, Hun Manet emphasized that Cambodia’s relationships with China and the U.S. “are not mutually exclusive,” underlining Phnom Penh’s intention to maintain friendly ties with multiple powers rather than align exclusively with any bloc.

In this context, engagement with a U.S.-linked initiative such as the BoP broadens Cambodia’s diplomatic bandwidth. Maintaining working relationships across different power centers reduces exposure to geopolitical shocks and escalation risks. A neutral foreign policy involves adopting calibrated positions that preserve room for maneuver. Expanding cooperative platforms is consistent with Cambodia’s long-articulated preference not to choose sides, if it can avoid doing so.

Domestic and institutional factors are a further influence. Under Hun Manet’s leadership, there has been an evident emphasis on projecting diplomatic professionalism and expanding Cambodia’s international engagement profile. Much recent domestic pressure stems from Cambodian public expectations regarding sovereignty and territorial integrity, particularly following the border conflicts with Thailand. This pressure has reinforced the need to demonstrate active and diversified diplomacy.

Importantly, Cambodia’s participation in the BoP has not been accompanied by any downgrading of relations with China. Phnom Penh continues to endorse and participate in major Chinese-led initiatives and maintains close economic coordination with Beijing. The Cambodia–China Free Trade Agreement, which entered into force in 2022, has further boosted bilateral trade, which exceeded $19 billion in 2025.

If the BoP were intended as a strategic reorientation, there would be visible retrenchment elsewhere. That has not occurred.

Instead, Cambodia appears to be layering partnerships rather than substituting one for another. The logic resembles portfolio management: diversifying platforms to maximize opportunity and minimize vulnerability in an uncertain regional order.

For Cambodia, joining the Board of Peace neither abandons established partnerships nor locks it into a new camp. It is simply a manifestation of a diversified foreign policy strategy that is shaped less by ideological or strategic allegiance than by the practical imperative of survival and adaptability.

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On February 19, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet traveled to Washington to attend the first meeting of U.S. President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace (BoP). Cambodia’s decision to participate in the initiative as a founding member has once again prompted speculation that Phnom Penh may be edging closer toward Washington. For a country often described as China’s most reliable partner in Southeast Asia, even limited engagement with a U.S.-associated platform is quickly interpreted as strategic realignment.

Much like Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s bid to join the BRICS grouping were misread as a tilt away from the West, Cambodia’s engagement with the BoP risks being squeezed into a binary “China versus United States” frame. The underlying assumption is that more engagement with Washington must mean less with Beijing.

This interpretation is overly reductive. It assumes that Cambodia’s foreign policy operates along a single axis and that participation in one initiative necessarily dilutes commitment to another. Such a framing obscures the layered and multi-directional character of Cambodia’s current external engagement.

A more grounded explanation begins by clarifying what the BoP is not. It is not a military alliance. It does not entail defense obligations, exclusive political commitments, or binding security arrangements. Its character is diplomatic and consultative rather than strategic in the hard-security sense. Treating Cambodia’s involvement as a pivot exaggerates the geopolitical weight of the platform itself.

The more analytically useful question is why Phnom Penh sees value in joining.

Three interconnected factors help explain the move: geostrategic positioning, geopolitical risk management, and domestic political considerations.

The first concerns geostrategic positioning. Cambodia’s prior endorsement of Chinese initiatives – from its early support for the Belt and Road Initiative and other Chinese global governance proposals, alongside its consistent adherence to the One-China Policy – does not lock it into a singular strategic orbit.

Cambodia has limited capacity to reshape an increasingly rivalry-driven regional order. In such conditions, maintaining a presence in multiple institutional arenas enhances flexibility, particularly when governance frameworks remain fluid. Participation in the BoP provides a structured diplomatic interface with Washington (and with President Trump) after a period in which bilateral ties have experienced periodic strains. It offers a politically manageable channel for rebuilding trust and expanding cooperation incrementally, without requiring strategic realignment.

At the same time, Cambodia’s economic and strategic ties with China are deeply embedded and unlikely to be reversed. Beijing remains a major source of investment, financing, and trade. In the textile and garment sector – the backbone of Cambodia’s export economy – production depends heavily on Chinese intermediate inputs and supply chains. The industry employs around 800,000 Cambodian workers, roughly 80 percent of whom are women. Their wages sustain households across the country. Chinese capital is also deeply involved in infrastructure development and construction, while tourism flows from China have long contributed significantly to national revenue.

Reversing course from China would therefore come with an economic cost. It would risk destabilizing export capacity, employment, and investor confidence. That structural reality makes the narrative of a geopolitical “switch” implausible. During an interview with Reuters while in Washington, Hun Manet emphasized that Cambodia’s relationships with China and the U.S. “are not mutually exclusive,” underlining Phnom Penh’s intention to maintain friendly ties with multiple powers rather than align exclusively with any bloc.

In this context, engagement with a U.S.-linked initiative such as the BoP broadens Cambodia’s diplomatic bandwidth. Maintaining working relationships across different power centers reduces exposure to geopolitical shocks and escalation risks. A neutral foreign policy involves adopting calibrated positions that preserve room for maneuver. Expanding cooperative platforms is consistent with Cambodia’s long-articulated preference not to choose sides, if it can avoid doing so.

Domestic and institutional factors are a further influence. Under Hun Manet’s leadership, there has been an evident emphasis on projecting diplomatic professionalism and expanding Cambodia’s international engagement profile. Much recent domestic pressure stems from Cambodian public expectations regarding sovereignty and territorial integrity, particularly following the border conflicts with Thailand. This pressure has reinforced the need to demonstrate active and diversified diplomacy.

Importantly, Cambodia’s participation in the BoP has not been accompanied by any downgrading of relations with China. Phnom Penh continues to endorse and participate in major Chinese-led initiatives and maintains close economic coordination with Beijing. The Cambodia–China Free Trade Agreement, which entered into force in 2022, has further boosted bilateral trade, which exceeded $19 billion in 2025.

If the BoP were intended as a strategic reorientation, there would be visible retrenchment elsewhere. That has not occurred.

Instead, Cambodia appears to be layering partnerships rather than substituting one for another. The logic resembles portfolio management: diversifying platforms to maximize opportunity and minimize vulnerability in an uncertain regional order.

For Cambodia, joining the Board of Peace neither abandons established partnerships nor locks it into a new camp. It is simply a manifestation of a diversified foreign policy strategy that is shaped less by ideological or strategic allegiance than by the practical imperative of survival and adaptability.

Chhay Lim is a designated deputy director at Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Institute for International Studies and Public Policy, Royal University of Phnom Penh. He is concurrently a Fulbright Visiting Scholar to Elliott School of International Affairs of the George Washington University.

China-Cambodia relations

U.S.-Cambodia relations

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