March 9, 2024, marked two years since an Indian BrahMos cruise missile misfired, accidentally landing in Pakistan’s Mian Channu city. While global attention at the time concentrated on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing nuclear risks, the incident in the subcontinent was unprecedented as it was the first time a cruise missile of one nuclear-armed state landed in another.

India’s only operational cruise missile is the supersonic BrahMos, which has land and air variants, while the subsonic Nirbhay remains in development. On the other hand, Pakistan operates supersonic and subsonic variants of the Hatf VII, along with other missiles. In the immediate wake of the 2022 incident, analysts and international institutions made several calls for more effective confidence building measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan, including extending an existing agreement between both states to pre-notify the other of ballistic missile tests to cruise missiles.

However, a CBM has yet to emerge, and both states have continued to test their suite of cruise missiles since the incident. India and Pakistan share a range of nuclear CBMs, including a unique 1988 non-attack agreement for nuclear installations, but lack an agreement for cruise missiles. Following Pakistan’s second test of its Ababeel ballistic missile equipped with Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) in November 2023, India tested a MIRV-capable Agni-V ballistic missile for the first time this month. The test has re-opened questions about strategic stability on the subcontinent, especially since India is also in the process of purchasing new ballistic missile defense systems and both states are rapidly advancing in missile technology.

The BraMos incident did not result in institutional change, though perhaps it should have, because of the incentive structure for both states to take this step.

In light of these developments, it is crucial to understand why the BraMos incident did not result in a CBM for cruise missiles, and what steps can be taken to move toward institutionalizing better communication at the bilateral level in the event of a future crisis. The BraMos incident did not result in institutional change, though perhaps it should have, because of the incentive structure for both states to take this step. The lack of incentive to create a CBM is driven by a perception that there is insufficient necessity for institutionalized change and escalation through conventional weapons is dubious.

Insufficient Necessity

An agreement on........

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