Godot was here. You just missed him. – Hoca Camide

Imagine you are doing a project with a colleague. There is a due date and the two of you work in sequence. Vladimir (you are Estragon) is working on his part and you are waiting to take over to finish the project. You never made an agreement with Vladimir to turn the work over to you at halftime, but you take it as a reasonable expectation that he will. But he doesn’t. The clock keeps ticking and you are getting restive.

At last, after 80% of the available time has passed, Vladimir sends you the work to complete it. Will you do it, perhaps with resentment, but will you do it? What if 90% of the time had passed? Suppose you are still able to finish the work, but the resentment is now greater. At what point will you say no, with the effect that neither you nor Vladimir will get the benefit of the completed work—if there is such a point?

The basic scenario is easy enough to imagine,and probably has a ring of familiarity. Similar scenarios can be imagined for any context in which one person waits for another in order to complete a joint affair. Being picked up for a date or any type of joint venture meets the structural requirements of this game.

The amount of time left is a variable. As this time window narrows, the risk for the first player to meet with the second player’s veto increases because the second player’s resentment increases. When the second player finally says no, we have a case of moral punishment because the second player destroys value for the first player at a cost to himself.

This interactional game shows the general features of the ultimatum game. By the........

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