Since its announcement on July 22, the U.S.-Saudi nuclear agreement has alarmed nonproliferation experts. The 30-year deal would open the way for U.S. companies to develop the kingdom’s nuclear infrastructure, but it could also allow Saudi Arabia to pursue nuclear enrichment on its own soil. Although the agreement is still under congressional review, it has already created fears that it will weaken the U.S. “gold standard”—the strict requirements Washington holds nuclear partners to—and thus encourage other Middle Eastern states to demand similar capabilities.

Adding to the uncertainties, U.S. President Donald Trump declared a day after the announcement that the terms of the deal were “totally subject” to Saudi Arabia normalizing relations with Israel by joining the Abraham Accords and insisted that “there will be no enrichment.” Neither of these conditions was apparently in the original announcement. Meanwhile, reports of confidential side letters to the deal have raised additional questions. Without knowing their contents, it is impossible to assess the agreement’s true implications.

Regardless of what conditions are present, however, the deal makes one thing absolutely clear: the central question is no longer whether Saudi Arabia will advance along the nuclear path but how its pursuit of nuclear power can be managed without igniting a nuclear arms race. Saudi Arabia is already in the final stages of completing an Argentine-designed low-power research reactor, and it has reportedly received bids from China’s National Nuclear Corporation, France’s EDF, Russia’s Rosatom, and South Korea’s Korea Electric Power Corporation to build two nuclear power plants. Although the kingdom has deliberately delayed making a final decision on those bids while negotiating with the United States, Saudi officials are determined to go ahead with their nuclear program as soon as possible.

This need not end in crisis. Rather than helping Riyadh make enrichment a national project and allowing it to go it alone on nuclear power, the Trump administration has another, better option: the United States should build a regional uranium enrichment framework through the establishment of a regional nuclear fuel bank on Saudi soil. Not only would such a mechanism reduce the risk of proliferation; it would also offer significant geopolitical and economic advantages, both to the United States and to the region. If Washington fails to explore this alternative, it could find itself facilitating the emergence of multiple national enrichment programs across the Middle East, driving a regional nuclear competition that will be far more difficult to contain than it is to prevent.

Nuclear nonproliferation experts have reason to take Saudi intentions seriously. In 2018, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman warned that if Iran went nuclear, Saudi Arabia would follow suit. Then, in September 2025, Saudi Arabia entered a mutual defense agreement with nuclear-armed Pakistan. Although that agreement did not mention nuclear weapons, it has reinforced the strategic ambiguity surrounding the Pakistani-Saudi relationship and serves as a reminder that Riyadh has alternative security options should it lose confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

Moreover, the United States has appeared to soften its position on Saudi nuclearization over time. In earlier years, Washington insisted that Saudi Arabia........

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