The governments of the United States and China both assert that theirs is the most important bilateral relationship in the world. They also agree that the likeliest trigger for an armed conflict between them is Taiwan. In theory, then, it should come as a relief that U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping discussed Taiwan at length in Beijing last month and that the leaders emerged with a better understanding of each other’s positions.

Yet the U.S.-Chinese summit was anything but reassuring. Rather, it represented Xi’s opening move in what will be a sustained effort to get the Trump administration to distance itself from Taiwan. Trump’s visit had barely begun when China released a statement that shared a warning Xi had imparted to Trump: if Taiwan “is handled properly, the bilateral relationship will enjoy overall stability,” but if it is not, “the two countries will have clashes and even conflicts, putting the entire relationship in great jeopardy.”

Xi intends to change what it means for Taiwan to be “handled properly” by the United States. Like his predecessors, Xi believes preventing Taiwan’s permanent separation is a core national interest and views its continued autonomy as evidence that China’s civil war remains unfinished. Unlike his predecessors, however, Xi appears to consider it essential to his legacy that he make tangible progress toward bringing Taiwan under China’s authority. At the beginning of his tenure, in 2013, Xi noted that the Taiwan question cannot continue to be passed on from generation to generation. He has since asserted that gaining control of Taiwan is central to China’s rejuvenation, a task that must be fulfilled by 2049, a century after the founding of the People’s Republic of China.

Although Xi has instructed his military to be ready to take Taiwan by 2027, his preference is to gain control of the island without firing a shot. Going to war, even against a weaker foe, is always hazardous, as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the United States’ military campaign against Iran make clear. If Xi invaded Taiwan and ended up in a protracted conflict, he would risk his power and legitimacy. And Xi knows that using force against Taiwan would come at the expense of economic development because the United States and its allies would, at the very minimum, respond by cutting China off from advanced technology and imposing crippling economic and financial sanctions.

Xi seems to have concluded that the surest path to securing control of Taiwan without a war runs through Trump, who has frequently criticized Taiwan and questioned the wisdom of defending the island. Xi’s influence was apparent in the days after the May summit, as Trump borrowed rhetoric from Beijing in statements about Taiwanese domestic politics and paused a pending arms sale to Taipei. Trump then repeated his claim that Taiwan stole the U.S. chip industry and said he did not want the United States to fight a war over Taiwan 9,500 miles away. His administration got the message. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth subsequently failed to mention Taiwan in his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, the first time a U.S. defense secretary omitted Taiwan from such a speech in a decade.

What is motivating Trump’s comments and his dismissal of decades of U.S. policy on arms sales to Taiwan is unclear. It might be a belief that this is the best path to de-escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait and avoiding an armed conflict. It could also reflect a conclusion that reducing support for Taiwan is a price worth paying for improved commercial access to China or a broader détente with Beijing.

The objective of China’s leader is far clearer. Xi is seeking to redefine what is considered normal in the United States’ approach to Taiwan. If China can bring about changes in U.S. policy that strengthen doubts regarding Washington’s reliability, doubts that have already gained ground because of the Trump administration’s general skepticism toward allies, many in Taiwan may conclude that they have no choice but to seek an accommodation on Beijing’s terms. Such a development would raise alarm throughout the region. U.S. allies would come to question the wisdom of putting their security in Washington’s hands, leading to a decisive shift in the balance of power in Beijing’s favor. American policymakers should recognize China’s strategy for what it is and stop giving ground on U.S. commitments to Taiwan—because for now, Xi is moving closer to the success he wants.

At the May summit in Beijing, Xi appeared to put two steps of his plan in motion. The first was to convince Trump that Taiwan is pursuing formal independence and that........

© Foreign Affairs