The consensus among analysts is that Hamas is down, but hardly out. The group may be badly battered, but it has been around since 1987, and in that time, it has been repeatedly attacked by Israel and has always grown back. The conditions that gave rise to the organization—occupation, dispossession, and humiliation at the hands of Israel—are as severe as ever. And in the Gaza Strip, there is no comprehensive alternative to Hamas’s governance. Even in its weakened state, the group has institutional memory, administrative infrastructure, and coercive capacity that its competitors cannot match.

But in truth, Hamas’s two-year war with Israel has decimated the organization beyond the point of recovery. It may still be more powerful than other groups in Gaza. But Israel’s bombing campaigns and invasion have cost Hamas essential military infrastructure, torn apart its leadership, and cut it off from its patrons. As a result, the organization lacks the power to actually rule Gaza. It is suffering from political paralysis and facing financial disaster in the enclave. Finally, it has lost public support: many Gazans blame the group for starting a war that has resulted in the destruction or damage of 90 percent of the homes in the Gaza Strip and the deaths of roughly four percent of the prewar population.

Despite these facts, officials on both sides of Gaza’s yellow line have embraced the idea that Hamas is alive and well. Members of Hamas perpetuate this farce for an obvious reason: they do not want to admit that they lost. But Israel is also pretending that its nemesis remains strong so it can justify its continuing military operations—and avoid having to answer difficult questions about the future of Palestinians.

UNAUTHORIZED OBITUARY

Since Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, Israel has killed an entire echelon of Hamas leaders. This includes its former top officials: Yahya Sinwar, Ismail Haniyeh, Mohammed Deif, and Mohammed Sinwar. In May of this year, Israeli forces assassinated Izz al-Din al-Haddad, the head of Hamas’s military wing, at a residence, along with some of his family. Eleven days later, it killed Haddad’s replacement, Mohammed Odeh, along with his wife and two of his children. Today, only one Hamas commander who held a senior position before October 7 is left standing: Imad Aqel. Israel has also taken out hundreds of midlevel commanders. What it has done, in other words, goes beyond a mere decapitation strategy. It has removed Hamas’s entire nervous system.

Israel has also rendered Hamas incapable of regeneration. The fact that Haddad and Odeh were killed in their homes, with their families, indicates that the safe houses, tunnels, and countersurveillance architecture that once made Hamas’s senior leadership elusive are now gone. So are its overseas outposts. In the last three years, Israel has killed (or tried to kill) Hamas officials in Iran, Lebanon, and Qatar.

It is therefore little wonder that Hamas is experiencing a leadership crisis. Since Yahya Sinwar was killed, in October 2024, the group has been unable to decide who should take the helm of its political bureau. Hamas’s Shura Council, made up of 50 to 80 members, was supposed to elect a new leader in early 2025, but it could not meet and vote because of Israel’s ongoing bombardment. When a vote was finally held in February 2026, it did not produce a winner. For now, the group is run by a five-man council that has been hamstrung by infighting.

The relationship between Iran and Hamas is effectively over.

Hamas has settled on two leadership candidates: Khalil al-Hayya and........

© Foreign Affairs