While indigenous civil society organisations (CSOs) are important actors in post-conflict peacebuilding, they have traditionally played a somewhat secondary role by carrying out unofficial Track II (T2) peacebuilding activities, such as peace education programs and problem-solving workshops. They are often absent from the negotiating table, with official mediation instead led by international actors and diplomats. This does not mean indigenous organisations are ineffective, but that their peacebuilding influence has tended to be more focused on community relations than determining a conflict’s future. However, in recent times, indigenous CSOs have increasingly assumed a more central role in peacebuilding operations. As international actors, most notably the United States, continue to roll back the amount of humanitarian funding and support given to peacebuilding, a space has opened for indigenous CSOs to more explicitly shape the future trajectory of their conflict and associated peacebuilding efforts.

By focusing on the Cypriot conflict, this short article will demonstrate how several peacebuilding CSOs have recently assumed greater responsibility and agency, notably by influencing the country’s peacebuilding priorities. As external actors continue to reduce their support, indigenous CSOs will likely play a central peacebuilding role in the future. We should no longer view them as secondary or peripheral actors, but as integral peacebuilders with an unmatched understanding and attachment to conflict and related peacebuilding efforts. 

Civil Society’s Peacebuilding Role

In recent decades, researchers and policymakers have increasingly argued that indigenous civil society organisations (CSOs) – here defined as organisations comprising of shared interests, purposes and values, distinct from the state, market and family, such as religious associations, women’s organisations and human rights groups – play a critical role in post-conflict peacebuilding (Barrow 2023, 1). As they are ingrained into disputant communities, they understand their ‘cultural context and nuanced dynamics’ (Jewett 2019, 119) and can thereby develop effective, working relationships with conflicting parties, who commonly perceive them as legitimate and well-meaning actors.

While there is wide recognition that indigenous CSOs should be involved in peace efforts, the specific means by which they contribute to peacebuilding continues to attract scholarly debate. Some scholars focus on the merits and drawbacks of including CSOs in official peace negotiations – Track 1 (T1) efforts – a practice often referred to as ‘direct participation’ in peace processes (Kew & Wanis-St. John 2008,17). The arguments put forward for including CSOs at this high level include their ability to ensure greater public representation in negotiations, while engendering societal and community ownership of an eventual peace agreement (Paffenholz 2014; Lorentzen 2020).

However, there have traditionally been few cases of CSOs directly influencing peace talks at the negotiating table, with Paffenholz noting that ‘negotiators have tended to favour the exclusion of CSOs from peace negotiations’ (Paffenholz 2014, 73). There are notable exceptions to this trend. For example, the 2003 peace settlement in Liberia was signed by the government and two rebel groups, besides several CSOs, such as the Inter-Religious Council for Liberia (Nilsson 2012, 244). However, other official peace negotiations, such as in Northern Ireland and Bosnia, were ‘exclusive’ given that those directly involved in the negotiations were ‘political leaders and diplomatic envoys’ (Kmec & Ganiel 2019, 151).

In these cases of exclusion, CSOs have historically embarked on unofficial forms of peacebuilding, which take place away from the negotiating table. In practice, CSOs typically become facilitators of unofficial Track 2 (T2) interventions. T2 is a term often attributed to Joseph Montville, who defined it as ‘unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations that aim to develop strategies, influence public opinion, organise human and material sources in ways that might help resolve their conflict’ (Montville and Davidson 1981, 192). T2 interventions are largely welcomed by officials and policymakers, as they typically supplement T1 diplomacy by creating peaceful conditions where official negotiations are more likely to succeed. Specific T2 interventions include dialogue forums, where parties are brought together by a facilitator to improve interpersonal relationships and understanding; problem-solving workshops, consisting of controlled communication where disputants are encouraged to discuss potential peacebuilding strategies; and peace education programs, designed to promote peaceful coexistence by countering divisive narratives (Burgess and Burgess 2010; Çuhadar & Dayton 2012).

Cypriot Peacebuilding and Civil Society

Cyprus has been divided between the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and the southern Republic of Cyprus (RoC) since Turkey’s 1974 invasion culminated in the separation of the island’s two largest ethnic communities, the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Official peace talks have taken place periodically over the past 50 years, but have repeatedly failed to appease both communities and resolve their points of contention.

The most recent attempts to resolve the conflict were the 2017 peace talks held at the Swiss resort of Crans-Montana. The talks were convened by the United Nations’ (UN’s) Special Adviser on Cyprus, Espen Barth Eide, and included representatives from Cyprus’ guarantor powers (Britain, Greece and Turkey), in addition to the EU and leaders of both the RoC and TRNC (Coufoudakis 2018). The talks lasted for ten days, beginning on 28th June 2017, before collapsing ‘amid anger and recriminations’ on 7th July (Smith 2017). One of the main points of contention was Turkey’s refusal to withdraw its troops from the island, which is a condition insisted upon by the Greek Cypriot (GC) community.

As has been the case with previous peace talks, the Crans-Montana negotiations were ‘exclusive’, with little opportunity for civil society inclusion. As such, the island’s civil society has traditionally relied on alternative means of peacebuilding,........

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