R&AW at 58: The Mossad Connection in a Changing Security Landscape
The Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) was established on September 21, 1968, following India’s intelligence failings during the 1965 war and in response to the growing strategic challenge posed by a nuclear-capable China. R N Kao, the agency’s inaugural chief, established an organization that would become instrumental in the intelligence campaign encircling the 1971 Bangladesh operation within three years. After 58 years, R&AW faces a far more complicated geopolitical environment. India now faces a far more volatile strategic environment, with Pakistan struggling with internal instability, the Iran conflict reshaping the Middle East, and the newly formed Mecca Pact creating an untested regional security framework. The fallout from October 7 has further blurred the boundaries between South Asian and Middle Eastern security threats.
Given the shifting threat environment, R&AW’s long-standing connection with Israel’s Mossad is becoming increasingly crucial. The alliance has remained purposely covert, allowing both countries to collaborate without exposing themselves to needless political risk. However, contemporary threats transcend national borders, establishing connections between terrorism, weapons transfers, financing, and state-sponsored networks in South Asia, the Middle East, and beyond. The challenge is whether a relationship based on discrete cooperation can now grow into a more systematic intelligence partnership appropriate for a more interconnected threat landscape.
The Foundations of an Intelligence Cooperation
The cooperation between R&AW and Mossad was initiated nearly simultaneously with the establishment of R&AW. In the late 1960s, R N Kao established relations with Israeli intelligence as both countries grew increasingly concerned about burgeoning security links between Pakistan, China, and North Korea. These concerns were further exacerbated by reports of Pakistani efforts to train Iranian and Libyan personnel in the handling of North Korean weapons with the assistance of China. Cooperation with Israel, according to Kao, provided India with access to a crucial intelligence partner who had experience tracing these networks. The cooperation also served to build a covert channel between India and Israel years before the two countries formalized diplomatic relations in 1992.
The partnership’s first significant test came in 1977. By that time, R&AW intelligence had proven that Pakistan was on the verge of producing weapons-grade uranium at its secret Kahuta enrichment facility. Ezer Weizman, the Israeli Defense Minister, visited India on a covert trip coordinated through R&AW and Mossad back-channel diplomacy. His objective was to persuade India to support Israel in launching a preemptive airstrike on Kahuta. The two operational possibilities explored were Israeli jets refueling in India before hitting the target or Israel launching the strike from Indian land, flying low through Himalayan valleys to elude Pakistani radar.
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