How Charles de Gaulle’s embargo transformed Israel from a customer into a competitor.

France did not intend to build one of the world’s most successful defense industries.

Yet, in an important sense, it helped do exactly that.

The story begins with France.

The decade following the Suez Crisis of 1956 found President Charles de Gaulle determined to restore France’s standing as an independent global power. The trauma of Algeria convinced him that France could no longer define its foreign policy solely through traditional Western alliances. Paris would pursue its own interests, cultivate its own relationships, and reclaim its influence throughout the Arab world. At precisely the same time, Israel reached a very different conclusion. Under the leadership of Ezer Weizman, the Israeli Air Force decided that the nation’s survival depended upon unquestioned air superiority. To achieve it, Israel turned to France and, in particular, Dassault Aviation.

The partnership proved remarkably successful for both countries. Israel acquired the Mirage III, while France gained an enthusiastic customer whose pilots would soon demonstrate the aircraft’s capabilities under the most demanding combat conditions imaginable. When the Six-Day War erupted in June 1967, the Israeli Air Force destroyed much of the Egyptian Air Force before it ever left the ground. The Mirage III became one of the most admired fighter aircraft in the world, and Dassault emerged as one of the great names in military aviation. Israel had acquired the aircraft it needed. France had acquired something equally valuable—international prestige.

Almost immediately after Israel’s victory, Charles de Gaulle imposed an arms embargo, freezing the delivery of aircraft and military equipment that Israel had already ordered and, in many cases, already paid for. France was pursuing its own strategic interests.........

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)