On 12 April 2026, Viktor Orbán’s 16 years in power came to an end.  The people of Hungary voted against authoritarianism, against populist nationalism, against racism, against corruption, against Hungary’s friendship with Putin, Trump and Netanyahu; for Europe, for democracy, for basic liberties and human rights.

The result marked a collective repudiation of an illiberal governing model that had gradually re-engineered Hungary. Voters signalled a preference for constitutionalism, pluralism, and European alignment over confrontation, centralisation, and permanent mobilisation.

Orbán’s defeat was the culmination of institutional fatigue, economic discontent, and geopolitical unease. For years, Hungarian politics was framed as an existential struggle: Brussels vs. Budapest, “the people” vs. “elites,” “traditional Hungary” vs. “liberal decadence.” What once mobilised support came to feel exhausting. A large share of voters wanted a normalisation of politics: fewer culture wars, more competent governance.

Viktor Orbán’s tenure was defined by a systematic “state capture” that hollowed out democratic institutions while maintaining the outward appearance of a multi-party system. His lost popularity was the result of a structural regime collapse; a regime that had built its legitimacy on the promise of “sovereignty” and middle-class stability.

Orbán’s illiberal model was a masterclass in constitutional engineering and informational autocracy. Through his previous supermajorities, Orbán rewrote the constitution to favour Fidesz, his national-conservative party. Orbán gerrymandered electoral districts and packed the Constitutional Court with loyalists. His government’s legal amendments consolidated executive leverage, enabling durable majoritarian control over key institutions. Reforms affecting the Constitutional Court and prosecutorial hierarchy reduced effective constraints on the executive. Orbán dismantled the independence of the judiciary and the civil service, transforming public institutions into arms of the ruling party.

A large portion of the media landscape moved into pro-government alignment, narrowing pluralism. Orbán consolidated over 500 media outlets under one umbrella, ensuring that rural voters received a curated reality of “migrant invasions” and “Brussels threats.” A system of National Cooperation (Hungarian abbrev.: NER) was introduced as a form of “New Social Contract.”   With EU funds and state contracts it created a new class of oligarchs (the “NER-elite”), leading to a system where economic success was tied to political loyalty.

In addition, NGOs and academic institutions faced legal, financial, and reputational constraints, shrinking the space for independent scrutiny.

Cumulatively, Orbán’s illiberal governing model produced a system in which formal democracy persisted, but substantive competition and oversight were weakened. The World Democracy Index described Hungary as a “flawed democracy,” as Israel is described. Netanyahu and his allies came to Budapest often to study Orbán’s masterclass and started to implement it in Israel.

Orbán’s 16 years in power changed Hungary dramatically. There was decline in public confidence in government and political parties and growing awareness of the country’s corruption. By 2026, Hungary had endured three years of relative economic stagnation. High inflation had decimated the purchasing power of the middle class, leaving the “Orbánomics” model of low taxes and high consumption in tatters.

Recurrent allegations were raised regarding the use of EU funds and the entrenchment of loyalist business groups weakened claims of clean, national stewardship. Orbán’s ambivalence toward Russia, especially after the invasion of Ukraine, clashed with the instincts of a society that, historically, understands the stakes of sovereignty. Orbán explained his policy by saying that Hungary’s close contacts with the Kremlin enable Hungary’s low energy rates, which work well for every household in Hungary.

But that was not enough. The contradiction between rhetoric of national independence and equivocation toward Russian aggression proved costly. Younger voters, more Europeanised and digitally networked, were less receptive to ethno-nationalist framing and more concerned with opportunity, mobility, and rule-of-law guarantees.

 Against this backdrop, Péter Magyar (meaning Hungarian) offered a reframed patriotism and a programme of institutional repair. By carrying the Hungarian flag to every rally, Magyar reclaimed national symbols from exclusivist narratives. His message of patriotism without exclusion, sovereignty without isolation, rang true in the ears of many.

Central to his platform is the rebalancing of institutions: strengthening judicial independence, depoliticising oversight bodies, and restoring credible checks on executive power. Commitments include transparent procurement, independent auditing of EU funds, and enforcement mechanisms that break patronage cycles. Magyar campaigned on a “Critical Pro-European” stance, realigning with the EU to unblock the €90 billion in frozen funds, while maintaining a firm hand on Hungarian interests in migration and agriculture.

His clear pivot toward constructive partnership with the EU includes readjusting Hungary with common European positions on security. Magyar promised to take measures to diversify ownership and protect editorial independence with the aim of re-opening the public sphere. His promised policies are oriented to middle-class recovery, targeted support for vulnerable groups, and investment in education and health, seeking to reverse the sense that growth accrued selectively and narrowly, guided by partisan politics.

Hungary’s transition will not be smooth. Reversing entrenched structures, rebuilding trust, and delivering tangible improvements will test the new leadership. Yet the mandate is clear: from illiberal consolidation to democratic renewal. It is a new dawn for Hungary and beyond.

Raphael Cohen-Almagor received his doctorate from the University of Oxford. He is a prolific scholar, a senior academic leader and institution-builder with a global profile in democracy, governance, and conflict resolution. Over a 30-year career, he has held senior leadership roles across leading universities and international institutions in Israel, the United Kingdom, the United States and Sweden.

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)