During elections in a democracy, old wounds become fresh again, painful memories are revived. The renewed discussion surrounding October 7 is similar.

Governance and high politics, particularly when political actors are responsible for protecting the security and interests of the State, operate according to a logic very different from that of family, society, or individual life. Obviously, We tend to judge political governance from our personal perspective because that is the world in which we live and are groomed. But statecraft operates in a different environment, involving intelligence, security, national interests, strategic calculations and sometimes extremely difficult choices. That is why politics can sometimes appear cruel. Politics and statecraft are autonomous.

It difficult to believe, therefore, that the October 7 attack was an entirely unforeseen surprise. History demonstrates that massive and brutal attacks sometimes take place even when warning signs already exist and, strangely, the victim State appears to be looking in another direction. Why does this happen? Answer is not in the jurisdiction of people, even electorate. Sometimes the full truth emerges years later; sometimes it may never emerge completely.

Consider Pulwama, India. On 14 February, 2019, an unusually large convoy of 78 vehicles carrying 2,547 CRPF personnel travelled by road from Jammu towards Srinagar. A suicide bomber attacked the convoy and 40 CRPF personnel were killed. The CRPF had requested five aircraft for transporting personnel but that the request was not accepted by the Home Ministry. The combination of prior security warnings, the unusually large road convoy, questions over air transportation, acknowledged vulnerabilities and the government’s decision just seven days later, on 21 February, 2019, to extend air-travel entitlement to all CAPF personnel on important Jammu and Kashmir routes legitimately raises the question of whether a foreseeable threat had been treated with sufficient urgency ?

The 26/11 Mumbai attacks of November 2008 provide another striking example. Intelligence alerts before the attack had specifically mentioned important Mumbai targets. Alerts issued on 9 August and 24 September 2008 reportedly about potential targets. American intelligence had also warned India about a potential Lashkar attack in Mumbai. Yet the attackers still succeeded in reaching Mumbai by sea.

The September 11, 2001 attacks offer another disturbing historical parallel. On 27 August 2001, Spanish police intercepted a telephone conversation involving an alleged al-Qaeda-linked network in which the caller said words translated as: “We have entered the field of aviation and we have even slit the throat of the bird.” Another interpretation referred to cutting the “eagle’s throat.”

Thus, intelligence history........

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)