In December 1997, India appeared to secure an important political success without firing a shot. The Bangladesh government and the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti, or PCJSS, signed the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord, ending more than two decades of armed conflict.

PCJSS had historical ties with India. During the conflict, India sheltered Indigenous refugees and gave political space to people connected with the movement. A successful Accord could therefore have stabilized India’s eastern frontier and strengthened New Delhi’s influence in a sensitive border region.

Nearly three decades later, that success looks less certain. The Accord remains substantially unimplemented. PCJSS has been weakened, Indigenous politics has been divided, military influence remains powerful, and Bangladesh is considering closer strategic cooperation with Pakistan.

This raises a difficult question: Did Pakistan begin undermining India’s apparent victory even before the CHT Accord was signed?

This article presents a theory, not a proven intelligence finding. No reliable public evidence establishes that Pakistani intelligence recruited Indigenous activists who opposed the Accord, or that clearly defined pro-India and pro-Pakistan factions existed within the Bangladesh Army. Yet the chronology, political relationships and strategic outcome create a pattern that deserves investigation. A theory should not be accepted simply because it sounds possible, but neither should it be dismissed merely because relevant files remain secret.

The most important fact is often forgotten: PCJSS chose peace. Its armed wing, the Shanti Bahini, surrendered its weapons, returned to civilian life and trusted the Bangladesh state. PCJSS accepted compromise because it believed peace could protect its people better than another generation of war.

The Accord promised stronger hill district councils, a regional council, settlement of land disputes, rehabilitation of refugees and the withdrawal of temporary military camps. These promises formed the political foundation on which PCJSS ended its armed struggle.

PCJSS took the greater risk. The state retained its Army, intelligence agencies and administrative power; PCJSS depended on the government’s word.

The Accord’s failure does not mean PCJSS chose the wrong path. It shows that powerful political and institutional interests were unwilling to complete the peace process.

India had reason to support the settlement. The CHT borders Tripura and Mizoram and lies near other sensitive parts of northeastern India. Peace would reduce armed activity, refugee movements and instability along India’s frontier.

Pakistan could have made the opposite calculation. A successful relationship between PCJSS and the Awami League government would give India a friendly Indigenous partner in a critical borderland. Pakistan would not need to control the CHT; it would need only to prevent the peace process from succeeding.

The opposition began before the Accord

UPDF was formally established on December 26, 1998, more than a year after the Accord. But the anti-Accord movement did not begin with the formal creation of UPDF.

Indigenous student politics had already divided over the expected agreement before December 2, 1997. One section supported PCJSS and the peace process, while an anti-Accord section criticized the negotiations and demanded full autonomy as the final agreement was still being prepared.

This chronology is central to the theory. The opposition did not arise only after activists read the signed Accord and became disappointed. It was already being organized while the agreement was under negotiation.

That does not mean the anti-Accord students had no genuine concerns. The Accord did not provide full autonomy, constitutional recognition or protection against every future threat. Young activists could sincerely believe that PCJSS was accepting too little.

But genuine dissatisfaction and outside manipulation can exist at the same time.

The theory is that Pakistani strategic actors anticipated the agreement and understood what its success could mean for India. Bangladeshi intellectual or political intermediaries may then have encouraged ambitious Indigenous students to reject the emerging agreement and begin a new movement for full autonomy.

The students may have been told that PCJSS was surrendering Jumma rights. They may also have been promised that a new movement would make them important leaders and that Indigenous people would eventually follow them.

If this happened, only a small leadership circle and selected intermediaries would have needed to understand the wider purpose. Ordinary activists could honestly believe they were fighting for Indigenous rights while their movement also served someone else’s strategic objective.

The result was a lasting division. PCJSS had surrendered its weapons, but the Indigenous population did........

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)